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THE CASE AGAINST COLLECTIVE 
LIABILITY 
J. SHAHAR DILLBARY* 
Abstract: Collective liability—defined as the imposition of liability on a group 
that may include innocent actors—is commonplace. From ancient to modern 
times, legislators, regulators, and courts have imposed such liability when they 
believe that the culprit is a member of the group. Examples of collective liability 
abound: from surgical teams held jointly liable for a misplaced sponge to entire 
families evicted from their homes for the drug-related activity of a single person 
under the “One Strike Rule.” Courts recognize, of course, that collective liability 
punishes the innocent, but they view it as a necessary evil to smoke out and pun-
ish an unknown wrongdoer in a known group. 
Despite the ubiquity of collective liability regimes, they remain under-theorized 
and under-studied. Proponents of collective liability justify its imposition on two 
grounds. First, claims of deterrence suggest that the threat of collective liability in-
centivizes innocent actors to monitor each other and take preventative measures. 
The second claim is that once a harm occurs, potential liability will encourage in-
nocent actors to share information that would identify the wrongdoer. 
Drawing on economic theory and empirical evidence, this Article sheds light on 
the dark side of collective liability. It concludes that, disconcertingly, collective 
liability regimes may lead to contrary results and perverse outcomes. Through 
clear examples, this Article reveals that collective liability can (1) erode actors’ 
incentives to monitor and take preventative measures, (2) incentivize those 
knowledgeable about the culprit’s identity to keep quiet, lie, or even plot with 
others to lie, and (3) help service providers (e.g., physicians) engage in forms of 
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harmful practices not heretofore known. Fortunately, in certain situations, some 
of the faults of collective liability are remediable. This Article provides a practi-
cal proposal that would minimize strategic behaviors, reduce the detrimental ef-
fects of collective liability, and bypass the identification problem altogether. This 
proposal offers a new path in medical malpractice, civil rights violations, assault, 
larceny, and a variety of other cases that are subject to group liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, a Brazilian judge faced a reverse Solomonic dilemma.1 A young 
girl brought a suit against two men, identical twins, arguing that one of them 
was her father (the Twin Case).2 DNA tests corroborated the young girl’s claim 
but could not determine which one was the father.3 Other evidence was equally 
unhelpful.4 The twins denied any relationship with the mother and blamed 
each other.5 The mother could not identify the true father either because the 
twins had previously impersonated one another and used each other’s names in 
order to mislead and swap partners.6 By the end of the trial, it was clear that 
                                                                                                                           
 1 T.J.G.O., Ap. Civ. No. XXXXXXXXXXX (redacted), Cachoeira Alta, Relator: Des. Filipe Luis 
Peruca, 21.03.2019, https://www.tjgo.jus.br/images/docs/CCS/duplapaternidade.pdf [https://perma.cc/
32HZ-6ZMU]; see also Lilian Cury, Dupla Paternidade Biológica: Juiz Determina Que Gêmeos 
Idênticos Paguem Pensão à Criança, TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO DE GOIÁS (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.tjgo.jus.br/index.php/institucional/centro-de-comunicacao-social/17-tribunal/6716-dupla-
paternidade-biologica-juiz-determina-que-gemeos-identicos-paguem-pensao-a-crianca [https://perma.
cc/ZFS4-U6H6]; Telephone Interview with the Honorable Filipe Luis Peruca, Dist. Judge at the Ca-
choeira Alta Ct., in the ctr. state of Goias (Sept. 13, 2019). The Biblical story (known as the Judgment 
of King Solomon) involves two women, each claiming to be the true mother of a newly born baby 
boy. 1 Kings 3:16–:28. It was clear that one of the women was lying, but it was impossible to deter-
mine which one. The two women lived alone in the same house when they had their babies, so there 
were no witnesses, and their testimonies were equally credible. In addition, the babies were of the 
same age (they were born within a three-day period). The identities of the women’s partners were also 
unknown (the women are described as “harlots”), thus ruling out the ability to rely on resemblance to 
the fathers. To force the truth out of the contestants, King Solomon ordered the division of the child 
between them. One woman was content. The other agreed to waive her claim to the baby, thereby 
identifying herself as the mother. For a critical view of the Solomonic solution, see Ian Ayres & Eric 
Tally, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1027, 1029 n.6 (1995); Jacob Glazer & Ching-To Albert Ma, Efficient Allocation of a “Prize”—
King Solomon’s Dilemma, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 222, 223–24 (1989); Motty Perry & Philip J. 
Reny, A General Solution to King Solomon’s Dilemma, 26 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 279, 279–80 
(1999); Cheng-Zhong Qin & Chun-Lei Yang, Make a Guess: A Robust Mechanism for King Solo-
mon’s Dilemma, 39 ECON. THEORY 259, 259–60 (2009) (reviewing the economic literature analyzing 
the Solomonic dilemma). 
 2 T.J.G.O., Ap. Civ. No. XXXXXXXXXXX (redacted). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Charlie Parker, Identical Twins Both Ordered to Pay Child Support After Inconclusive Paternity 
Test, N.Y. POST (Apr. 4, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/04/identical-twins-both-ordered-to-pay-
child-support-after-inconclusive-paternity-test [https://perma.cc/P5CN-VAYW] (reporting that the 
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one of the defendants was lying and the other telling the truth, but it was im-
possible to determine who was the girl’s father.7 The twins thought that, with 
each one of them having an equal probability of being the true father, the case 
would be dismissed.8 They were wrong.9 In a decision that sent shock waves 
worldwide,10 the judge ordered that the names of both twins appear on the birth 
certificate and that each fully pays child support.11 
The Twin Case is not an exception in our legal landscape. Collective lia-
bility regimes—those that impose liability on a group that clearly includes in-
nocent actors—are everywhere.12 They are used by legislators, commonly em-
ployed by regulators, and permeate our judicial system. An example of a group 
liability regime that impacts millions—many of whom are poor people of col-
or—is President Bill Clinton’s “One-Strike-and-You’re-Out” Rule (the One 
Strike Rule).13 As Ms. Pearlie Rucker learned, the rule allows public housing 
                                                                                                                           
judge found that the twins used each other’s names, “either to attract as many women as possible or to 
hide betrayal in their relationship.” (quoting T.J.G.O., Ap. Civ. No. XXXXXXXXXXX (redacted), 
Cachoeira Alta, Relator: Des. Filipe Luis Peruca, 21.03.2019)). 
 7 T.J.G.O., Ap. Civ. No. XXXXXXXXXXX (redacted). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., Brésil: Des Jumeaux ne Reconnaissent pas un Enfant, les Deux Paieront la Pension, LE 
PARISIEN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/bresil-des-jumeaux-ne-reconnaissent-pas-
un-enfant-les-deux-paieront-la-pension-02-04-2019-8045139.php [https://perma.cc/G2MD-TFWM]; 
Ernesto Londoño & Lis Moriconi, Who’s the Daddy? Neither Twin Would Say. But They Both Will 
Pay., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/americas/brazil-paternity-
dna.html [https://perma.cc/K3UC-7KRX]; Twin Brothers Will Both Have to Pay Child Support After Sex 
Trick, N.Z. HERALD (Apr. 5, 2019) https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/twin-brothers-will-both-have-
to-pay-child-support-after-sex-trick/LWTL5HG567TPFYYMFSKF2W6B54 [https://perma.cc/JSL8-
6XJZ]. 
 11 U.S. courts facing a similar dilemma were able to determine the identity of the father using 
non-genetic “soft” evidence, such as the mothers’ testimonies. See, e.g., Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Aid ex rel. 
Masinelli v. Whitworth, 652 N.E.2d 458, 460–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Missouri ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Miller, 218 S.W.3d 2, 6–7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 12 Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the Guilty: The 
Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 81 (2007) (“[T]here are 
many enforcement contexts in which the identity of the offender is uncertain but he or she is known to 
be a member of a well-defined group.”); Hal R. Varian, Monitoring Agents with Other Agents, 146 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 153, 153 (1990) (“[It] is common to find incentive mecha-
nisms that involve agents monitoring each other.”). 
 13 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (requiring local public housing authorities to include in their leases 
a provision that allows for the eviction of tenants under such conditions). The rule was codified as part 
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 
(2002); OFF. OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., NOTICE PIH 96-16 (HA), 
“ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” SCREENING AND EVICTION GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING 
AUTHORITIES (HAS) (Apr. 12, 1996), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/96-16pihn.doc [https://
perma.cc/K5FR-8DFE]; see also HUD Announces “One Strike” Rules for Public Housing Tenants, 
NAT’L DRUG STRATEGY NETWORK (May 1996), https://www.ndsn.org/may96/onestrik.html [https://
perma.cc/F968-PXY7] (reporting on the new eviction guidelines permitting eviction on the grounds of 
drug use or other criminal activity). 
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authorities to evict an entire family if one of the household members or their 
guests engage in any drug activity on or near the premises.14 In Ms. Rucker’s 
case, the eviction proceedings started after her daughter was caught with co-
caine three blocks from her apartment.15 The fact that the daughter was mental-
ly disabled or that the other occupants—Ms. Rucker, her grandchildren, and 
great-granddaughter—were innocent was of no consequence.16 Ms. Rucker 
challenged the decision. She argued that the rule did not allow the eviction of 
innocent tenants, and, if it did, that the rule was unfair and unconstitutional.17 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous decision, it held 
that a public housing authority can evict an entire group of tenants even if they 
“did not know, could not foresee, or could not control” the culprit’s behavior.18 
Collective liability regimes have been subject to much debate. Although 
in the past moral and racial considerations dominated the discussion,19 in re-
cent years, two economic justifications have emerged in support of applying 
collective liability. The first, exemplified by the motivation behind the One 
Strike Rule, is deterrence.20 The claim is that the threat of collective liability 
incentivizes innocent actors to monitor each other and take preventative 
measures.21 The second justification, exemplified by the Twin Case, is that 
once a harm occurs, liability will encourage innocent actors to share infor-
mation that would identify the wrongdoer.22 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 127–28. The three other respondents included two elders whose grandchil-
dren were caught smoking marijuana in the complex parking lot and a tenant whose caregiver and two 
others were caught smoking cocaine. Id. On its face, Rucker may seem like an individual liability case 
as Ms. Rucker was the only named tenant on the lease. In effect, however, the rule imposed collective 
liability by subjecting each household member to the same sanction. See infra note 240. 
 15 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 128. 
 16 Id. at 131–32. 
 17 Id. at 129. 
 18 Id. at 129, 136 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567 (1991)). 
 19 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 347 (2003). 
 20 See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 151 (2001) (discuss-
ing both ex post and ex ante rationales for collective liability); Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and 
Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 913 (1994) (referring to the deterrence rationale as the 
“most obvious economic interpretation” for the doctrine); Levinson, supra note 19, at 349 (arguing 
that collective liability allows the regulator to delegate deterrence role to a target group); Miceli & 
Segerson, supra note 12, at 87 (“The threat of group punishment in such a setting may therefore be an 
effective way to encourage monitoring of precaution before the fact (thus promoting deterrence) and 
revelation of information after the fact (thus saving on detection costs).”); see also discussion infra 
Subpart II.A (revisiting the deterrence rationale for collective liability). 
 21 This was the Supreme Court’s rationale in Rucker. 535 U.S. at 134, 136 (explaining that the 
“no fault” eviction “maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties”). 
 22 See Levinson, supra note 19, at 368 (asserting that a collective liability regime “harness[es] the 
defendants’ private information about each other’s behavior”); Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra 
and More: Overextraction and the Puzzle of Immoderate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1561–
62 (1995) (explaining that incentivizing witnesses to identify the careless actor serves as a modern 
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The prior literature on collective liability often uses a 1944 California Su-
preme Court case, Ybarra v. Spangard, to epitomize the two rationales.23 In 
Ybarra, the victim underwent an appendectomy and woke up with an unrelated 
arm and shoulder injury.24 The accident itself bespoke of negligence, but the 
victim, who was under full anesthesia, could not identify the injurer, and mem-
bers of the surgical team refused to volunteer any information.25 To avoid in-
justice to the plaintiff, the court fashioned a new theory now known as “collec-
tive res ipsa loquitur.”26 Under this theory, each member of the medical team is 
presumed to be “negligent” unless such member provides exculpatory evi-
dence.27 Law and economics scholars laud Ybarra.28 They explain that the the-
ory (a) deters wrongdoing by encouraging actors to monitor each other and, (b) 
if an accident occurs, the doctrine encourages the faultless to provide infor-
mation pointing to the injurer.29 
Drawing on economic theory and empirical evidence, this Article sheds 
light on the dark side of collective liability. It concludes that, disconcertingly, 
collective liability regimes may lead to contrary results and perverse outcomes. 
Upending common belief, the Article reveals that collective liability can incen-
tivize actors to suppress information that would identify the responsible par-
ties. Communal liability can also reduce actors’ incentives to monitor each 
other and erode their incentives to take care. Moreover, the Article reveals that 
collective liability allows service providers to engage in forms of defensive 
and offensive practices that have gone unnoticed. 
                                                                                                                           
justification for collective liability); see also discussion infra Subpart II.C (examining collective lia-
bility’s role in extracting information from innocent witnesses). 
 23 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 19, at 379; Levmore, supra note 22, at 1562; see also Ybarra v. 
Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. 1944). 
 24 Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 688. 
 25 Id. at 689–90. 
 26 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 158, at 381 (2000) (explaining the circumstances 
under which courts apply collective res ipsa); see, e.g., Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 53 (N.J. 
1999) (defining “collective res ipsa loquitor” as the application of “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor . . . 
in cases involving multiple defendants and multiple theories of liability such as negligence”); see also 
discussion infra Part I (describing the elements of res ipsa loquitur (res ipsa)). 
 27 Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 691; see infra note 43 (discussing the effects of the doctrine). 
 28 See, e.g., PORAT & STEIN, supra note 20, at 155–56 (referring to Ybarra as the “Injured Shoul-
der Case” and lauding its deterrence and information-harnessing features); Levmore, supra note 22, at 
1561–64 (arguing that collective liability “is surprisingly similar to the famous case of Ybarra v. 
Spangard,” and dubbing it “shrewd, judge-made law”); Miceli & Segerson, supra note 12, at 87 (ar-
guing that the rule in Ybarra is “an effective way to encourage monitoring of precaution” and “thus 
promot[e] deterrence”); see also infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
 29 See discussion infra Subparts II.A, II.C (reviewing the prior scholarship on collective res ipsa). 
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The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part I begins with 
examining the cost of holding innocent actors liable (i.e., false positives).30 It 
does so by tracking the evolution of res ipsa loquitur (res ipsa) from an indi-
vidual liability regime to a collective liability scheme. Close scrutiny shows 
that in each step of the doctrine’s development, the concern of holding inno-
cent actors liable has been considerably understated. Part I also reveals that res 
ipsa is a form of stacked (or pyramidic) inferences—inferences drawn from 
other inferences. Such inferences are so speculative that many jurisdictions pro-
hibit them, and others use them with caution. Yet, although res ipsa is a clear 
form of stacked inferences, it has been accepted by virtually all jurisdictions de-
spite the concern that liability may be imposed on an innocent party. As Part I 
explains, when res ipsa is used as a collective liability mechanism, the risk of 
false positives nears certainty. 
Part II examines the lauded benefits of collective liability doctrines like 
res ipsa. Subpart II.A focuses on the cross-monitoring rationale. It shows that, 
in some cases, group responsibility can dilute the parties’ incentives to monitor 
and take care and can lead to more accidents. In other cases, collective liability 
may result in over-investment in monitoring. It can even incentivize actors to 
use monitoring as a means to ensure no one takes care. Finally, Subpart II.A 
shows that in some cases, like Ybarra, the law makes it impossible for the par-
ties to contract around collective liability regimes even when doing so would 
be socially desirable. 
Subpart II.B shows that collective liability allows service providers, such 
as physicians, to engage in new forms of defensive and offensive practices.31 It 
reveals, for example, that tort law incentivizes surgical teams to unnecessarily 
inflate the number of team members and even aggravate the victim’s injuries. 
Physicians may do so to reduce their expected liability or increase their profits 
at a high cost to their patients. The findings are in line with recent empirical 
studies.32 Subpart II.B adds to this growing body of scholarship by identifying 
the mechanisms that allow such perverse behaviors to take place unnoticed and 
offers means for curbing them. 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Miceli & Segerson, supra note 12, at 82 (“The chief drawback [in collective liability 
regimes] is the cost associated with wrongful punishment of the innocent.”). 
 31 Defensive practices are defined as unnecessary measures service providers take to shield them-
selves from liability. An example is when a physician takes excessive care. Service providers engage 
in offensive practices when they persuade a customer to engage in an activity that is detrimental to the 
customer but is more profitable to the provider. An example is when a physician persuades a patient to 
undergo an unnecessary procedure that is not in the patient’s interest to increase the physician’s com-
pensation. See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (discussing defensive and offensive prac-
tices). 
 32 See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
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Subpart II.C addresses the information-extraction rationale often men-
tioned as the most important justification for holding innocent actors liable.33 It 
reveals that this rationale, which courts and scholars alike have adopted, may 
have also been exaggerated. In many cases, the defendants are not, and cannot 
be, ex ante in a position to provide information that would identify the true 
injurer or exculpate themselves. Even more disturbing, Subpart II.C shows that 
tort law can incentivize defendants to lie or collude with others to suppress 
information that would identify the responsible parties. 
Part III discusses the informational role of negligence judgments. Such 
judgments have a public good feature: they provide vital information to third 
parties. For example, a judgment against a service provider informs consumers 
that the defendant’s practices fall below the acceptable standard of care. The 
judgment also alerts other providers that they must follow the newly an-
nounced standard or expect a higher cost of operation (in the form of liability). 
The signals provided by the negligence judgment also allow better providers to 
distinguish themselves and avoid a “lemon” market.34 Part III further shows 
that collective liability not only mutes the voice of a negligence verdict, it may 
also help disseminate false information. 
Part IV reconsiders the application of collective liability regimes. Subpart 
IV.A reveals two insights that may explain why some collective liability re-
gimes were successful, whereas others failed. After providing a new theoretical 
basis, Subpart IV.B offers two solutions that could minimize strategic behav-
iors, reduce the detrimental effects of collective liability, and bypass the identi-
fication problem altogether. 
I. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE LIABILITY 
One collective liability regime that has been consistently cited with much 
approval by law and economics enthusiasts is res ipsa.35 The doctrine applies 
when the accident is a mystery, but the circumstances bespeak of negligence.36 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 19, at 379 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most obvious reason for 
imposing liability on a group is that the outside sanctioner cannot cost-effectively narrow down the 
identity of the wrongdoer any further” and suggesting that “[c]ollective sanctions can harness a 
group’s superior information to increase the probability that an individual wrongdoer will be sanc-
tioned”). 
 34 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 499–500 (1970) (discussing the use of institutional signals to decrease 
uncertainty for the buyer as to the quality of goods and services sold). 
 35 See infra notes 76–87, 164–167 and accompanying text (discussing prior literature in the field 
of law and economics on res ipsa). 
 36 Stodder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 48 A.2d 622, 624 (Me. 1946) (explaining that res 
ipsa applies when “there has been an unexplained accident, and the instrument that caused the injury 
was under the management or control of the defendant, and in the ordinary course of events the acci-
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Examples include an injury from a falling object,37 a tire flying off a moving 
car’s wayward wheel,38 or an exploding bottle.39 In these situations, the plain-
tiff cannot show who caused the accident and whether it was caused by care-
lessness, and courts do not require the impossible. Instead, res ipsa relieves the 
plaintiff of the need to substantiate her case with specificity.40 The doctrine 
only requires the plaintiff to prove two general elements: (a) that the type of 
accident does not usually occur unless someone was careless, and (b) that the 
defendant had exclusive control over the injuring instrumentality.41 The first 
element—the type of accident—gives rise to an inference that the accident was 
caused by someone’s carelessness.42 The second element—the defendant’s ex-
clusive control—gives rise to the inference that the defendant caused the harm. 
From these inferences, a jury may draw a third and final inference: the defend-
ant was the “someone” who carelessly caused the harm.43 Figure 1 below illus-
trates the inferential chain. 
                                                                                                                           
dent would not have happened if the defendant had used due care”); DOBBS, supra note 26, § 154, at 
370–71 (discussing the general rules of res ipsa). 
 37 Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299. 
 38 McDougald v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1998). 
 39 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 437–38 (Cal. 1944). 
 40 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 154, at 370. 
 41 Newell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 36 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1994). Another oft-mentioned 
condition is that the accident “must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the 
part of the plaintiff.” Mejia v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 737 N.Y.S.2d 350, 353 (App. Div. 2002); 
DOBBS, supra note 26, § 159, at 384. 
 42 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 154, at 370–71. 
 43 The effect of applying res ipsa varies across states. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 40, at 257 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that “[t]here is more agreement as to 
[when res ipsa applies] than as to its procedural effect”). In its weakest form, res ipsa simply gives rise 
to a permissible inference: allowing the factfinder to infer that the defendant behaved carelessly. Id. 
§ 40, at 257–58. This form of res ipsa merely allows the plaintiff to survive a motion for summary 
judgment or a motion for directed verdict and make her case before the jury. Id. In some states, the 
doctrine gives rise to a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. Id. In these jurisdic-
tions, when res ipsa applies, the factfinder must presume that the defendant behaved carelessly unless 
the defendant offers evidence to the contrary. Id. § 40, at 258–59. If the defendant meets the burden of 
production, the plaintiff must still persuade the factfinder that the defendant behaved carelessly. Id. In 
other jurisdictions, res ipsa shifts the burden of production and persuasion. Id. In that case, the de-
fendant must convince the factfinder that it is more likely than not that the defendant did not behave 
carelessly or cause the victim’s harm, and if the defendant cannot do so, the defendant must lose. Id. 
Finally, in at least one state, New Jersey, when the doctrine (dubbed the “Anderson holding”) applies, 
the jury must hold at least one defendant liable. Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1975); see 
infra notes 67–73 and accompanying text (discussing the Anderson v. Somberg case). 
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Figure 1: The Res Ipsa Pyramid of Stacked Inferences 
Consider cases like Byrne v. Boadle,44 where a barrel that fell from the 
defendant’s shop hit the plaintiff, and Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,45 
where the plaintiff was poisoned after chewing tobacco containing a decaying 
human toe. In these cases, the factfinder first inferred that (1) the type of acci-
dent did not usually occur unless someone was careless (barrels do not fly 
through the air, and human toes are not present in tobacco cans); and (2) the 
defendant (the merchant in Byrne and the tobacco manufacturer in Pillars) 
caused the victim’s harm because the defendant exclusively controlled the in-
strumentalities that injured the victim.46 From these two inferences, the fact-
finder drew a third—that the defendant was the “one” who carelessly caused 
the harm.47 
As Byrne, Pillars, and Figure 1 above illustrate, res ipsa is a clear form of 
stacked inferences—that is, inferences drawn from other inferences. Jurisdic-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299. 
 45 Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 365–66 (Miss. 1918). Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. did not rely explicitly on the doctrine of res ipsa, but subsequent courts construed it as a 
res ipsa case. See, e.g., Newell, 36 F.3d at 579 (citing Pillars for the proposition that res ipsa “relieves 
a plaintiff” from proving her case with specificity because some “accidents are so unusual that the 
party shown to be in exclusive control of the injuring object ought to be held responsible unless that 
party can offer a reasonable explanation”). 
 46 Pillars, 78 So. at 366; Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299–300. The doctrine permits both inferences 
to be drawn from the same set of circumstances. See Ripley v. Lanzer, 215 P.3d 1020, 1030 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that the inference of carelessness and causation against a surgeon can “be 
established by the same circumstantial evidence . . . [of] leaving a scalpel blade in [the patient]’s 
knee”). 
 47 Pillars, 78 So. at 366; Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299–301. 
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tions vary in their attitudes toward deriving inferences from inferences.48 Many 
prohibit the practice while others allow it in certain circumstances.49 All agree, 
however, that inference-stacking comes with a serious risk that the final con-
clusion—the last link in the inferential chain—will be tenuous, unfounded, and 
devoid of any probative value.50 The concern is that “the chain of inferences 
[will spin] out into the region of barest conjecture.”51 
Courts and scholars often miss or ignore the pyramidic nature of res ipsa. 
The result is a puzzle. Why are pyramided inferences prohibited in most juris-
dictions and applied with much caution in others, whereas res ipsa—which is 
itself a form of stacked inferences—has been adopted by virtually all jurisdic-
tions?52 The answer may be found in the development of the doctrine. Res ipsa 
did not start as a collective liability theory.53 In its early days, res ipsa applied 
in cases where a single agent caused the victim’s harm.54 In these cases, the 
risk that an innocent person would be held liable was low. Byrne and Pillars 
are good examples. With only one suspected party—the flour merchant in Byr-
ne and the manufacturer in Pillars—the inference that it was the defendant’s 
carelessness that caused the harm could be justified. 
Over time, however, courts extended res ipsa to cases involving multiple 
causes and agents, thereby turning it into a collective liability theory. Courts 
did so by holding that the second element of res ipsa (exclusive control) was 
satisfied, even when it was clear that it was not. The result was a speculative 
inferential chain that likely imposed liability on faultless parties. In the name 
of fairness to the victim, courts were willing to impose collective liability even 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules Against Basing an Inference upon 
an Inference or a Presumption upon a Presumption, 5 A.L.R. 3d 105 (1966) (summarizing the ap-
proach of different jurisdictions to the rule against stacked inferences). 
 49 Id. at 104–05. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Hall v. Ferro-Concrete Constr. Co., 50 N.E.2d 556, 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). 
 52 The only exception is South Carolina. See Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169, 179 
(S.C. 2010) (“South Carolina does not follow the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”). The question is even 
more puzzling given what seems to be a general trend to erode the probative role of inferences. See 
Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 435, 437 (2014) (arguing that “the judici-
ary has systematically undermined the powerful tool of inference drawing”). 
 53 Other areas of the law experienced the opposite trend: a move from collective to individual 
liability. See Avner Greif, Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Re-
sponsibility, 158 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 168 (2002) (using game theory to explain 
the transition from the community responsibility system in late medieval times to individual liability); 
Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise and Fall of Communal Liability in Ancient 
Law, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 489, 504 (2004) (explaining that “the rise and fall of communal lia-
bility was potentially driven by changes in the structure of society”). 
 54 See, e.g., Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 365 (Miss. 1918) (stating that “R. J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company was the sole manufacturer of the tobacco” (emphasis added)); Byrne v. 
Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299–301 (holding only the Liverpool flour merchant responsible 
for negligence). 
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at the cost of sacrificing innocent defendants. Domany v. Otis is illustrative.55 
In Domany, the plaintiff was injured when an escalator at a department store 
stopped abruptly.56 The plaintiff sued the store, whose employees operated the 
escalator, and the service company that maintained and inspected it.57 As in the 
Twin Case, each defendant tried to shift liability to the other by arguing that 
the other had exclusive control over the escalator.58 And, as in the Twin Case, 
the court rejected that attempt and held both defendants liable.59 The Domany 
court explained that the second inference (exclusive control) was satisfied ei-
ther because both defendants had “joint” control over the instrumentality or 
because the service company controlled the escalator, and the store had a non-
delegable duty.60 
Whereas some courts, like Domany, use fictions such as “joint control” 
where none exist, others explicitly use res ipsa to impose collective liability on 
innocent actors. Ybarra v. Spangard61 and Anderson v. Somberg62 are illustra-
tive. Both cases involved a surgery with a team of doctors and nurses where a 
patient suffered an injury that was unrelated to the medical procedure. In both 
cases, the plaintiff, being under full anesthesia, could not prove his case 
against any of the defendants.63 Relying on notions of justice and motivated by 
a desire to elicit information from the medical team, the Ybarra court relaxed 
the control requirement.64 It held that the plaintiff did not need to identify the 
instrumentality that caused the harm or even prove that the instrumentality was 
in the exclusive control of the defendants.65 Rather, the court held that “all 
those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities”—
both the innocents actors and the culprit—were presumed to be negligent un-
less they provided exculpating evidence.66 
The Anderson holding is even more extreme. In Anderson, the tip of a 
forceps-like instrument broke off during surgery and became lodged in the 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604, 613–14 (6th Cir. 1966). 
 56 Id. at 607. 
 57 Id. at 614. 
 58 Id. at 613; see also supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing the facts in the Twin 
Case).  
 59 Domany, 369 F.2d at 613–14; see also supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (examining the 
outcome in the Twin Case). 
 60 Domany, 369 F.2d at 613–14. 
 61 Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690–91 (Cal. 1944). 
 62 Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1975). 
 63 See Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 688; Anderson, 338 A.2d at 3. 
 64 Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 690–91. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 691 (emphasis added). 
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plaintiff’s spinal canal.67 The evidence identified a number of possible causes, 
including (1) the mishandling of the instrument, (2) other surgeons who used 
the instrument in previous procedures, (3) the hospital, or (4) a defect that the 
manufacturer or the distributor caused.68 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that the jury must return a verdict against one or 
more of the defendants.69 Collective res ipsa, the court explained, would help 
identify the injurer and avoid “a miscarriage of justice.”70 
The Ybarra and Anderson courts used res ipsa to create a pool of poten-
tially liable defendants.71 In both, it was very likely that some members of the 
medical team did not commit any wrongdoing and may not have been privy to 
any information that would help them identify the tortfeasor.72 But as the re-
mainder of this Article shows, even if actors can point to the culprit and have 
exculpating evidence, it is not clear that they would provide it. In some cases, 
suppressing or even colluding with others to suppress information may be a 
winning strategy.73 Moreover, collective liability may erode the incentive to 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Anderson, 338 A.2d at 3. The Anderson holding, although not identified as such, is a form of 
res ipsa. See Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 53 (N.J. 1999) (“The Anderson-type cases utilize 
collective res ipsa loquitur in that both the burden of coming forward with evidence and the burden of 
persuasion are shifted to the defendants.”); DOBBS, supra note 26, § 249, at 652 n.10. 
 68 See Anderson, 338 A.2d at 3–4. The instrument was previously used twenty times by different 
surgeons, each of whom could have caused the defect. Id. at 3. 
 69 Id. at 4. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Anderson, however, takes things further for at least three reasons. First, Anderson makes it 
almost impossible for innocent defendants to exculpate themselves. While Ybarra merely shifted the 
burden of production to the defendants, Anderson shifted the burden of production and of persuasion. 
Compare id. at 5 (holding that defendants “must prove their nonculpability, or else risk liability for 
the injuries suffered”), with Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 691 (holding “merely . . . that where a plaintiff re-
ceives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants 
who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may 
properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their con-
duct”). As a result, a defendant can no longer simply offer an explanatory account but must instead 
prove that she was not negligent. Second, the Anderson holding was based on the assumption that the 
injurer was among the defendants, and accordingly, group liability would result in an identification 
process that would single out the culprit. See Anderson, 338 A.2d at 4. However, this assumption was 
based on fiction rather than facts. The instrument that broke off was used approximately twenty times 
by different surgeons, none of whom were named as defendants. Id. at 3. As a result, there was a sig-
nificant risk that innocent people would be held liable for a wrong that they did not commit. Id. at 9–
10 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Finally, to make things worse, Anderson requires the factfinder to hold 
at least one defendant liable—regardless of the actual evidence against her. See id. at 7 (majority opin-
ion) (holding that “[t]he judge may grant any motion bearing in mind that the plaintiff must recover a 
verdict against at least one defendant” (emphasis added)). 
 72 See infra notes 109, 193 and accompanying text. 
 73 It is thus not surprising that in Ybarra, the California Supreme Court’s prediction (or hope) that 
the threat of liability would incentivize the parties to divulge information proved to be wrong. In a 
second trial, all defendants were held liable after each testified but denied seeing anything that could 
have caused the harm. Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 P.2d 445, 446–47 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). 
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take care and monitor, detrimentally impact activity levels, and result in more 
accidents.74 
II. THE CASE AGAINST (CERTAIN) COLLECTIVE LIABILITY REGIMES 
This Part presents the case against the widely accepted view that collec-
tive liability is justified. It shows that even on theoretical grounds, collective 
liability schemes should give policy-makers pause. As explained below, even 
avid proponents admit that collective liability schemes impose liability on in-
nocent parties. What they fail to recognize is that the alleged benefits—
monitoring, deterrence, and information extraction—may be much smaller 
than they assume. 
 Even worse, using stylized examples this Part shows that collective liabil-
ity may lead to unintended and antithetical results to those advocated by its 
proponents. Subpart II.A analyzes the cross-monitoring rationale. It shows that 
in some cases collective liability can erode the parties’ incentives to monitor 
each other and take care, whereas in other cases it may lead to over-
investment. Subpart II.B revisits the information-forcing rationale and reveals 
that collective liability can in fact do the opposite: collective liability may in-
centivize those with private information to suppress it, lie, collude with others 
to lie, or even encourage wrongdoing. Subpart II.C illustrates how collective 
liability can foster service providers to engage in defensive and offensive prac-
tices. 
 To be clear, this Article’s goal is not to show that all collective liability 
regimes are flawed. Under certain conditions, collective liability regimes can 
prove effective. Rather, the goal of the stylized examples is to reveal cases 
where collective liability raises concerns. Moreover, the examples employed to 
showcase the detrimental potential of collective liability regimes are realistic. 
Each is modeled after real cases, parties are assumed to have heterogeneous 
abilities, juries and judges are not assumed to be omniscient, and asymmetric 
information is an accepted reality. By contrast, this Part shows that the justifi-
cations raised by proponents of collective liability theories often rely on as-
sumptions that may have limited applicability, are inconsistent with legal reali-
ties, and fail to appreciate the parties’ incentives to behave strategically. By 
providing a more nuanced description of the effect of collective liability re-
gimes, the Article attempts not only to reinvigorate the debate surrounding 
their use, but also to lay the groundwork for future empirical work. 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See infra Subpart II.A (discussing collective liability’s adverse effects on cross-monitoring). 
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A. Cross-Monitoring 
The prior literature lauds collective liability’s ability to foster cross-
monitoring and views this ability as a major rationale for its application.75 Af-
ter reviewing this literature, this Article re-evaluates the cross-monitoring justi-
fication. Section 1 begins by exploring cases where collective liability may 
result in under-investment in monitoring. Section 2 analyzes the Monitoring 
Dilemma and the inefficiencies that it may generate. Section 3 investigates 
another source of concern—cases where the monitoring agent faces high su-
pervision costs. Section 4 explains why, in some cases, despite low transaction 
costs, the parties cannot contract around the inefficiencies identified in Sec-
tions 1–4. Finally, Section 5 reveals that collective liability regimes may incen-
tivize parties to monitor each other to ensure that no one takes care. 
The literature on collective liability initially focused on preliterate socie-
ties.76 In an influential article, Judge Richard Posner explains that these “primi-
tive” societies rely heavily on group responsibility to achieve deterrence.77 
Thus, when an injurer fails to compensate the victim, the victim’s kin group 
can retaliate against any of the injurer’s kinsmen. This, in turn, encourages the 
injurer’s kinsmen to weed out potential injurers, control their conduct, and turn 
them in.78 
Others have extolled the deterrence effect of group responsibility regimes 
in modern societies. Hal Varian, for example, discusses the application of 
communal liability to microfinancing.79 When banks consider whether to pro-
vide small loans to low-income entrepreneurs, they must determine the appli-
cants’ creditworthiness and monitor their performance. When this is impossi-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See infra notes 76–89 and accompanying text (describing the prior, favorable discussion of 
collective liability as a tool for effective cross-monitoring). 
 76 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1980) (“The principle of collective responsibility—so abhorrent to modern sensi-
bilities—may be efficient in the conditions of primitive society.”); see also Miceli & Segerson, supra 
note 12, at 84–85; Parisi & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 53, at 491–97. 
 77 Posner, supra note 76, at 42–44; cf. Grady, supra note 20, at 913 (stating that “[t]he most obvi-
ous economic interpretation [for res ipsa in cases like Byrne] is that the normal proof requirements 
would yield too many false negatives” and explaining that “[i]f Byrne v. Boadle-type plaintiffs had to 
prove specific negligence, defendants would have too little incentive to use precaution” (citing Byrne 
v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299)). 
 78 Posner, supra note 76, at 43–44. The collective liability is strict. The injurer’s kinsmen are 
liable even if the accident was unavoidable, perhaps because the cost of determining fault is too high. 
Another possibility is insurance. Strict liability turns the injurer’s kinsmen into insurers in case the 
injurer is unable or unwilling to compensate the victim. Id. 
 79 Varian, supra note 12, at 155; see, e.g., Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, 
https://www.nobelpeaceprize.org/Prize-winners/Prizewinner-documentation/Muhammad-Yunus-
Grameen-Bank [https://perma.cc/6L8X-XV38] (summarizing how microcredit works and introducing 
some background principles of microfinancing). 
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ble, some banks extend loans but assign the borrowers to groups where each 
group member serves as a co-guarantor.80 The scheme is reminiscent of the 
modern One Strike Rule.81 It incentivizes “mutual monitoring” and “mutual 
insurance.”82 Focusing on product liability law, other scholars argue that res 
ipsa deters accidents, reduces the expected liability of evidentiary costs, and 
fosters the adoption of “new evidentiary technology,” such as tracking devices 
and body cameras.83 
Since the 1990s, the literature has treated collective res ipsa, and specifi-
cally Ybarra v. Spangard, as the canonical example of an effective deterrence 
regime.84 Saul Levmore analyzes the doctrine and refers to it as “shrewd, 
judge-made law.”85 Others have justified group liability in cases like Ybarra, 
where members of the group are (supposedly) in a better position to monitor 
and control potential wrongdoers.86 Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson 
describe Ybarra as “an effective way to encourage monitoring of precaution 
. . . [and thereby] promot[e] deterrence.”87 As the Section below shows, how-
ever, the deterrence and cross-monitoring rationales may be overstated, and 
even faulty, in cases like Ybarra. 
                                                                                                                           
 80 This model is still used today. See Credit Lending Models, GRAMEEN BANK, www.grameen.
com/credit-lending-models [https://perma.cc/7YNK-DPMQ]. The “Grameen Model” is described as 
follows: 
Groups of five prospective borrowers are formed; in the first stage, only two of them 
are eligible for, and receive, a loan. The group is observed for a month to see if the 
members are conforming to the rules of the bank. Only if the first two borrowers repay 
the principal plus interest over a period of fifty weeks do other members of the group 
become eligible themselves for a loan. Because of these restrictions, there is substantial 
group pressure to keep individual records clear. In this sense, collective responsibility 
of the group serves as collateral on the loan. 
Id. In 2006, the Grameen Bank and its founder, Muhammad Yunus, were awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize for their work combatting poverty through micro-financing. Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, 
supra note 79. 
 81 See supra notes 13–22 and accompany text (discussing the application of the One Strike Rule 
and its legislative intent). 
 82 Varian, supra note 12, at 155. 
 83 Alice Guerra et al., Presumption of Negligence and the Robustness of Liability Incentives 5 (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334448 [https://perma.cc/WYB5-
HWFP] (citing Alice Guerra et al., Presumption of Negligence and the Efficient Adoption of Evidence 
Technology 5 (Working Paper, 2019)). 
 84 154 P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. 1944). 
 85 Levmore, supra note 22, at 1563. Levmore offers an even more “radical rule” that would also 
deter injurers from engaging in wrongdoing. Id. Under Levmore’s proposed “overextraction rule,” the 
defendants would be required to pay more than the victim’s injury. Id. at 1575–78. This, he explains, 
may deter the wrongdoing in the first place as it will disgorge the benefits from the wrongful behav-
ior. Id. at 1579–80. 
 86 PORAT & STEIN, supra note 20, at 158–59; Levinson, supra note 19, at 348–49, 379. 
 87 Miceli & Segerson, supra note 12, at 87. 
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1. Underinvestment in (Care and) Monitoring 
One thing that the prior literature failed to appreciate is that collective lia-
bility can lead to under-deterrence. As the number of actors subject to group 
liability increases, the individual incentive of each actor to take care and moni-
tor the other may decrease. To illustrate, consider first an alternative care situa-
tion, like Example A1 below, where the injury can be avoided by any one of 
the parties. 
Example A1: A patient may suffer an expected damage of D=$30 
(e.g., due to a forgotten sponge, administration of the wrong drug, or 
infliction of a mysterious burn or trauma).88 The surgeon can avoid 
the harm if she exercises care at a cost of $20. The harm can also be 
averted if any member of the medical team monitors (e.g., by count-
ing the sponges inserted and removed, reviewing the patient’s medi-
cal chart, or testing the equipment and ensuring it is used properly) 
and alerts the surgeon of any mistake at a cost of $20.89 
Consider a medical team consisting of a surgeon and a nurse. Efficiency 
requires that the surgeon exercises care or that the nurse engages in monitoring 
(20<30). This could be achieved easily if the law imposed liability on one of 
the parties, for example, the surgeon. However, if liability is imposed collec-
tively on multiple parties—as the law in most jurisdictions requires—the result 
could be that none would take care or monitor. To see why, consider the 
nurse’s options.90 If the nurse monitors the surgeon, the nurse can expect to 
                                                                                                                           
 88 For cases applying res ipsa in similar situations, see, for example, Schaffner v. Cumberland 
Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 336 S.E.2d 116, 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (a burn inflicted during a surgical 
procedure by a malfunctioning cauterizing device); Rosales-Rosario v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & 
Med. Ctr., 767 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (App. Div. 2003) (a heavily sedated plaintiff “sustained a burn on 
the inner portion of her knee while hospitalized to give birth”). In Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center, an unconscious patient suffered a burn on her leg during a C-section. 791 P.2d 193, 
195 (Utah 1990). It was clear that one of the team members inflicted the injury, but it was impossible 
to determine who or what caused the harm. The court applied res ipsa against the entire group explain-
ing that its “purpose . . . is to compel those who were awake, aware, and in control of all possible 
injuring instrumentalities to explain the occurrence.” Id. at 199. As Example A1 shows, group liability 
may have the opposite effect. 
 89 It is very likely that the surgeon’s cost of monitoring while performing surgery is substantially 
higher than that of a nurse. Example A2 below explores such a case. 
 90 The examples in this Section assume that the parties cannot contract around collective liability 
rules. The assumption may seem unrealistic, improbable, and naïve, especially in the medical context. 
After all, a surgical team is comprised of a small group of individuals, positioned in close proximity, 
who must closely work and communicate with each other. On its face, there is no reason to believe 
that such actors cannot contract with each other. Similarly, the hospital’s cost of unilaterally institut-
ing procedures that would assign responsibility to one party is also unlikely to be prohibitive. Still, 
there are good reasons to believe that bargains may not be easily achieved. First, bargaining over a 
service (monitoring) can prove a complicated task. Such bargaining may also be infeasible. Healthcare 
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incur a cost of $20. By contrast, if the nurse does not engage in monitoring, the 
nurse can expect one of two outcomes. First, if the surgeon takes care and thus 
averts the harm, the nurse can expect to pay nothing. If the surgeon fails to take 
care, both will be collectively liable for the entire harm, and consequently, each 
can expect to pay $15 (half the $30 damage). The result is a dominant strategy. 
No matter what the surgeon does, the nurse’s best strategy is to forgo monitor-
ing. For the same reason, the surgeon would not take care either (0, 15<20). 
Here, collective liability erodes the parties’ incentives to the point that 
taking care and monitoring are not in the parties’ best interests. The result is 
underdeterrence and more accidents. The incentive to take care and cross-
monitor decreases even further as the number of parties subject to collective 
liability increases. For example, with a medical team of one surgeon and four 
nurses, no one would be interested in taking care or engaging in monitoring 
even if the cost of doing so is only $7 (30/5<7). 
2. Overinvestment and the Monitoring Dilemma 
In Example A1, collective liability eroded the parties’ incentives to avoid 
the accident and resulted in suboptimal care and monitoring levels. In other 
cases, collective liability may lead to the opposite result. It may incentivize the 
actors to overinvest in monitoring. Example A2, which is modeled after Deuel 
v. Surgical Clinic, is illustrative.91 
Example A2: There is a 10% chance the victim will suffer a $300 
damage during a procedure (i.e., the expected harm is D=$30). The 
surgeon can reduce the chance of an injury to 2% if she takes care at 
a cost of $5. The remaining risk of harm (e.g., due to a forgotten 
sponge) cannot be avoided by the surgeon who must focus on the 
complex surgical procedure. But it can be completely eliminated if 
any member of the medical team (e.g., a nurse) monitors the surgeon 
at a cost of $1. 
Consider a medical team that includes a surgeon and two nurses, Nurse-1 
and Nurse-2, and suppose that the parties are subject to collective liability. Ef-
ficiency requires that the surgeon takes care. By investing $5, the surgeon can 
reduce the expected harm by $24, from $30 (300x10%) to $6 (300x2%). Moni-
                                                                                                                           
providers—physicians, anesthesiologists, and nurses—often work with different parties in different 
facilities. However, as this Section explains, the main hurdle for contracting around liability is the law 
of res ipsa. See infra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2009-01551-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3237297, at 
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2010); infra notes 98–105 and accompanying text (describing the facts of 
Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC). 
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toring by a nurse is also cost-justified. It can eliminate the residual $6 expected 
harm at a cost of $1. 
The parties’ actions, however, depend on their private expected costs and 
payoffs. Game theory predicts that the surgeon will take care92 but is unable to 
predict the nurses’ actions. The nurses may over- or under- invest in monitor-
ing. Unlike Example A1, here the problem is not over-dilution. If the nurses 
fail to monitor the surgeon, the entire medical team—the surgeon and the two 
nurses—will be held collectively liable. Still, the cost of monitoring, $1, will 
be lower than the amount each nurse can expect to pay if neither monitors the 
surgeon, $2 (6/3). The problem the nurses face is that of free riding if each 
trusts the other to take care, or that of mistrust, in which case both may moni-
tor (the Monitoring Dilemma).93 
To illustrate the nurses’ Monitoring Dilemma, suppose, for now, that each 
member of the team acts independently.94 Consider Nurse-1’s options. Nurse-1 is 
better off not monitoring the surgeon if Nurse-2 monitors the surgeon (in which 
case Nurse-1 can free-ride on Nurse-2’s efforts). However, Nurse-1 is better off 
monitoring if Nurse-2 does not monitor or cannot be trusted to monitor.95 Nurse-
2 faces the same dilemma. The dilemma would be easily solved if the parties 
could agree to assign the task of monitoring to one of them. As explained below, 
however, tort law does not respect such agreements.96 Absent coordination, the 
result is multiple equilibria. In such a case, without a (pure) strategy, it is impos-
sible to predict what the nurses will do. It could be that neither, one, or both 
nurses will end up monitoring the surgeon. The first case—where no one moni-
tors—would result in underinvestment in monitoring. The latter—where both 
nurses monitor—would result in overinvestment in monitoring. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 The surgeon has a dominant strategy to take care. If the surgeon does not take care, the surgeon 
can expect to either pay $30 if held solely liable for the harm; or $10 (30/3) if the entire team is held 
collectively liable (due to res ipsa). By contrast, at a cost of $5, the surgeon can reduce her expected 
liability to $2 (1/3 x 6) if neither nurse engages in monitoring, or to $0 otherwise. See discussion infra 
Part II.A.4 (explaining that most jurisdictions will hold the surgeon liable for the nurses’ failure to 
monitor). 
 93 For example, in the case of counting sponges, one nurse cannot be sure that the other nurse is 
actually counting or that this other nurse is not distracted while counting. 
 94 In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the hospital and the healthcare providers cannot contract 
around collective liability rules. See discussion infra Part II.A.4 (discussing court decisions prohibit-
ing healthcare providers from contracting around collective liability rules). 
 95 If Nurse-2 does not properly monitor the surgeon, the entire medical team—the surgeon and 
two nurses—will be held liable for the entire $6 harm. Accordingly, each can expect to pay $2 (6/3). 
Thus, if Nurse-2 does not monitor, Nurse-1 is better off monitoring at a cost of $1 (1<2). 
 96 See infra Part II.A.4. 
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3. The Low-Cost Monitor 
Another source of inefficiency can occur if the less efficient party engag-
es in monitoring. To illustrate this point, note first that in Example A2, the 
nurses are equally efficient in monitoring. Each can reduce the residual risk of 
harm at a monitoring cost of $1. In reality, it is likely that actors’ monitoring 
costs vary. In that case, when the cost of monitoring is heterogeneous, the so-
cial cost associated with the Monitoring Dilemma can increase, and substan-
tially so. For example, suppose that the monitoring costs for Nurse-1 and 
Nurse-2 are $1 and $1.5 respectively. Efficiency requires that the cheapest cost 
avoider, Nurse-1, engage in monitoring (1<1.5). However, due to distrust, it 
could be that Nurse-2 would end up monitoring the surgeon or, even worse, 
both nurses will. In the latter case, the monitoring cost will reach $2.5 (1+1.5), 
an increase of 150% compared to the socially desirable level of monitoring. 
4. (No) Monitoring by Assignment 
The concerns discussed above—that cross-monitoring will result in over- 
or under- investment in care—result from collective liability’s dilutive effect. 
When liability is imposed on many, the incentives to monitor could be overly 
eroded or result in an excessive level of monitoring. These maladies can be 
easily cured if the parties could contract around the imposition of collective 
liability. For example, if the parties could agree to assign to one actor (a) the 
task of monitoring and (b) liability for inadequate monitoring, the parties and 
society would be better off. 
To illustrate, recall that in Example A1 either party could avoid a $30 in-
jury at a cost of $20. Yet, neither will avoid the harm because collective liabil-
ity promises each a loss of $15 (30/2), which is lower than the cost of taking 
care or monitoring (15<20). However, if the parties could, they would enter 
into an agreement that assigns one of them the task of monitoring and splits the 
cost. The agreement would avoid the victim’s harm (20<30) and reduce the 
expected loss of each actor to $10 (20/2). In Example A2, an agreement to as-
sign the monitoring task to one of the nurses would allow the parties to over-
come the Monitoring Dilemma, avoid overinvestment, and impose liability on 
the cheapest cost avoider. Note that the same (anti-dilution) solution can be 
instituted unilaterally if the hospital’s procedures could assign to one of the 
nurses (a) the monitoring task and (b) any liability for failing to properly moni-
tor. Such procedures would reduce the hospital’s expected liability, lower the 
cost of the medical procedure, and improve the hospital’s competitive position. 
Parties, however, cannot contract around collective liability rules, and 
(with a few rare exceptions) hospital procedures cannot delegate liability ei-
ther. The biggest hurdle to the assignment solution—and one that literature on 
collective liability has ignored—is not high transaction costs. It is the law it-
2021] The Case Against Collective Liability 411 
self. Many jurisdictions make such assignment impossible.97 These jurisdic-
tions do not allow a surgeon to rely on the nurses’ sponge count even when 
hospital procedures specifically require the surgeon to do so. 
For example, in Deuel, a sponge was left in the patient’s body despite a 
double count by the two nurses employed by the hospital.98 At trial, the sur-
geon, an independent contractor, argued that due to the complicated nature of 
the surgical task, he had to rely on the nurses’ count as was customary.99 The 
nurses admitted as much. They explained that the “[hospital’s] procedure re-
quired assisting nurses to count . . . sponges placed in and removed from the 
. . . patient’s body” and “that the surgeon does not supervise the nurses’ sponge 
count, and ‘has the right to rely upon the nurses to give . . . an accurate 
count.’”100 The nurses even conceded that they performed their monitoring 
task negligently.101 Based on these findings, the trial court held that collective 
res ipsa could not apply and dismissed the case against the surgeon.102 The 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed. Siding with the majority of jurisdic-
tions, it held that res ipsa’s exclusive control requirement should be broadly 
interpreted to allow the imposition of liability on many.103 As in Domany v. 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See, e.g., Burke v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 475 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the sur-
geon “attempted to shift responsibility for the injury [a retained sponge] by asserting that the nurse’s 
sponge count was reported (obviously erroneously) as in order” and explaining that “[w]hile this may 
be enough to support shared liability on the part of the nurse’s employer . . . it does not relieve the 
operating and supervising surgeon of his responsibility”); Breaux v. Thurston, 888 So. 2d 1208, 1214 
(Ala. 2003) (holding that, despite clear hospital procedures assigning the role of counting sponges and 
instruments to nurses, such procedures do not “relieve the surgeon of his or her responsibility to re-
move the sponges in the first place” and explaining that “[t]he nurses’ responsibility of counting [the 
sponges] amounts to only an added precaution taken by the defendant to help insure that he had 
properly performed his duty” (quoting Powell v. Mullins, 479 So. 2d 1119, 1126 (Ala. 1985))); 
Baumgardner v. Yusuf, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277, 279–81 (Ct. App. 2006); Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 
N.E.2d 1192, 1200 (Ind. 2008) (agreeing with prior precedent that “a surgeon may not escape his 
responsibility to remove sponges used during the surgery simply by delegating responsibility for 
tracking surgical sponges to attending nurses”); Coleman v. Rice, 706 So. 2d 696, 699 (Miss. 1997); 
Tutton v. Patterson, 714 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn. 1986) (explaining that “reliance on a sponge count 
does not, as a matter of law, relieve a doctor from liability for leaving a sponge in a patient”); Easter-
ling v. Walton, 156 S.E.2d 787, 789, 791 (Va. 1967) (applying res ipsa against the surgeon despite the 
plaintiff’s sister, a nurse in the hospital, testifying that “it was customary at the hospital for two nurses 
. . . to keep a count of the lap pads put in and taken out of the wound during an operation”); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g, illus. 9 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
 98 Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2009-01551-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3237297, at *2, 
*16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 99 Id. at *2. 
 100 Id. at *3. 
 101 Id. at *8. 
 102 Id. at *4. 
 103 Id. at *12–13; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text (reviewing cases that prohibit 
contracting around and delegating liability). 
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Otis, the court held that the surgeon’s duty was nondelegable.104 The court ex-
plained that, “[w]hile responsibility for sponge counts may be delegated to 
support staff, liability cannot be.”105 As a result, the surgeon was held liable 
together with the nurses. 
A notable exception to the rule prohibiting contracting around collective 
liability is Van Hook v. Anderson.106 In Van Hook, as in Deuel, the hospital 
adopted written procedures that required two nurses to count the sponges in-
serted and removed, and to notify the surgeon if their counts did not match.107 
Consistent with the procedures, at the end of the surgery, the nurses notified 
the surgeon that all sponges were removed. They were wrong. A sponge was 
left in the patient’s body. The question before the court was whether the sur-
geon was collectively liable with the nurses. The court answered in the nega-
tive. Unlike in Deuel, the Van Hook court gave full power to the hospital’s pro-
cedure and held that the surgeon could not be held liable when the responsible 
nurses failed to count the sponges.108 
Van Hook allows a hospital (and the parties) to opt out of the collective li-
ability regime and impose liability on the responsible party—the ones assigned 
with the task of monitoring. Van Hook, however, is a rarity in the legal land-
scape. The majority of jurisdictions do not allow actors to contract around col-
lective liability rules.109 Instead, they require innocent actors to subsidize the 
culprit and the latter to pay only a fraction of the harm caused. Courts do so in 
the name of fairness and deterrence.110 However, the result may be inefficient 
levels of monitoring and care as well as more accidents. 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Deuel, 2010 WL 3237297, at *16; see Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 
1966). 
 105 Id. (quoting Coleman v. Rice, 706 So. 2d 696, 699 (Miss. 1997)). 
 106 Van Hook v. Anderson, 824 P.2d 509, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 107 Id. at 510. 
 108 Id. at 513. The court held “that a doctor in charge of an operation is in compliance with the 
medical standard of care if he or she, in the process of closing an incision, relies on a positive asser-
tion by the nurses that the two counts match.” Id. The court also declined to apply the captain-of-the-
ship theory—another collective liability theory. Id. at 515. It explained that the nurses acted according 
to a policy established by their employer, the hospital, that the surgeon had no “reason to doubt the 
information that [the nurses] gave him,” nor control over the nurses. Id. 
 109 See, e.g., supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (discussing Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 
369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1966), an opinion that illustrates this approach). 
 110 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2010); DOBBS, supra note 26, 
§ 158, at 382, § 249, at 651 (noting that “[i]t is sometimes suggested that by holding all [healthcare 
providers] liable, those with knowledge would be forced to reveal it” and explaining that “[h]olding 
all the defendants hostage would itself be a justified response if evidence showed that all of them had 
knowledge of the facts,” but also noting that in Ybarra this “was not the case and it is inherently im-
probable that everyone in an operating room knows exactly what everyone else is doing every second 
of the time; at least one person’s eyes should be on the scalpel”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 39, 
at 253 (explaining that in cases like Ybarra “there is obviously a deliberate policy . . . which requires 
the defendants to explain or pay, and goes beyond any reasonable inference from the facts; and one 
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5. Monitoring to Not Take Care 
Collective liability can also incentivize the parties to use monitoring as a 
means to ensure that no one takes care. This can happen, for example, in a case 
like Ybarra, where each actor can be a sufficient cause of the harm, as illus-
trated in Example A3 below. 
Example A3: A patient can incur an expected damage, D=$70 (e.g., 
due to trauma) unless each member treats the patient with care at a 
cost of $20 (e.g., the cost of carefully repositioning the patient’s 
body during the procedure). Each member can monitor the others at 
a cost of $1. Absent cross-monitoring, if the victim is injured, it 
would be impossible to identify the injurer. 
Consider first a case where monitoring can incentivize the parties to mon-
itor each other and take care. To see that, consider a team with two actors. In 
such a case taking care is cost justified. It would result in a total investment of 
$40 (20x2) to avert a $70 harm. But if the parties are subject to collective lia-
bility, it is not clear that they will take care. To see why, note first that if both 
actors take care, each can expect to pay only $20 (the harm is avoided). If nei-
ther takes care, both will be liable, and each can expect to pay for half of the 
harm, $35 (70/2). Finally, if only one of them takes care, that actor can expect 
to lose $55—the $20 investment in care and an expected liability of $35 (both 
must take care to avoid the harm). Consider now Actor-1’s choices. Actor-1 is 
better off taking care if Actor-2 does the same (20<70/2), but Actor-1 is better 
off forgoing taking care if Actor-2 does not take care (35<55). The analysis of 
Actor-2’s options is identical. The result is multiple equilibria, and as a result, 
neither party may elect to take care—an inefficient result. 
Here, independent monitoring by the parties can substitute an agreement 
to take care (or ensure that it is adhered to if the parties can enter into an 
agreement). Each party can monitor the other’s actions and take care so long as 
the other does the same. The result is that with a total investment of $42 
(20+20+1+1), the parties can avoid a $70 harm. 
But monitoring can also help the parties ensure that no one takes care. 
Consider, for example, a case with a team of five healthcare providers. Here, 
taking care is inefficient. It would require a total investment of $100 (20x5) to 
avoid a $70 harm. The parties would be better off if they forgo taking care. 
Even if they would be subject to liability, each can expect to pay only $14 
(70/5). An agreement to forgo taking care may be unethical, illegal, and unen-
                                                                                                                           
may surmise that this is not unconnected with the refusal of the medical profession to testify against 
one another”); see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690–91 (Cal. 1944). 
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forceable,111 but the parties do not need to enter into such an agreement. Each 
can simply observe (that is, monitor) the others and avoid taking care so long 
as the others do the same. If successful, each can expect to pay $15 (14+1), 
which is lower than the $20 cost of care. 
B. Defensive and Offensive Practices 
The prior literature has demonstrated that, in the context of individual lia-
bility, parties can act strategically to shield themselves from liability, increase 
their benefits, or both. For example, previous empirical studies have shown 
that a physician can reduce her expected liability by taking excessive care in 
the form of prescribing unnecessary tests and drugs.112 Such practices are 
known as “defensive medicine.”113 
A service provider can also engage in offensive practices—practices that 
are aimed to increase the service provider’s benefits.114 For example, offensive 
medicine occurs when a physician induces the patient to choose a treatment 
that is not in the patient’s interest, but is more advantageous to the physi-
                                                                                                                           
 111 Economic efficiency requires that the parties be exempted from liability (100>70). The parties 
may nevertheless be held liable because courts often engage in an individual cost-benefit analysis. 
They compare the cost of precaution of each party, $20, to the avoidable harm, $70. See J. Shahar 
Dillbary, Contracting for Torts, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1057–62 (2017) (discussing how tort 
law may enforce agreements that contract law would find to be against public policy due to their tor-
tious nature). 
 112 See, e.g., Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine? 111 
Q.J. ECON. 353, 388 (1996); Sabrina Safrin, The C-Section Epidemic: What’s Tort Reform Got to Do 
with It?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 747, 762; Press Release, Am. Coll. Emergency Physicians, EMTALA 
Services Medical Liability Reform (2013), https://www.acep.org/globalassets/uploads/uploaded-files/
acep/advocacy/federal-issues/medical-malpractice-issue-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERY9-FDG2] 
(“More than half of emergency physicians responding to a 2011 survey said they order the number of 
tests they do because they feared being sued.”). Defensive medicine can also take the form of an inac-
tion—avoiding beneficial treatments that may involve a higher risk of litigation or liability. See, e.g., 
J. Shahar Dillbary et al., Why Exempting Negligent Doctors May Reduce Suicide: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 93 IND. L.J. 457, 490–93 (2018) (discussing liability’s overdeterrence effect). 
 113 Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Intensity of Treatment: 
Evidence from Heart Patients, 39 J. HEALTH ECON. 273, 274 (2015). 
 114 Both defensive and offensive medicine are in tension with the Hippocratic Oath, which re-
quires a physician to “prescribe regimen for the good of [their] patients . . . and never do harm to any-
one.” See M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine: A Bane to Healthcare, 3 ANNALS MED. 
& HEALTH SCIS. RSCH. 295, 295 (2013) (quoting The Oath of Hippocrates of Kos, 5th Century BC, 
Physician Oaths, ASS’N AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS, INC., https://www.aapsonline.org/ethics/
oaths.htm [https://perma.cc/35KT-6ZBL]). For a more modern version, see William C. Shiel, Medical 
Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINENET, https://www.medicinenet.com/hippocratic_oath/
definition.htm [https://perma.cc/7S8Z-FY98] (requiring doctors to “apply, for the benefit of the sick, 
all measures which are required, avoiding those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihil-
ism”). 
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cian.115 A common example is choosing an invasive procedure (e.g., a Cesare-
an section (C-section)) over non-invasive, more effective, and less risky treat-
ment (e.g., a vaginal delivery) because the former is more profitable for the 
physician.116 
Unlike practices that stem from the threat of individual liability, the stra-
tegic behavior that may result from collective liability remains undertheorized. 
This Subpart takes the first step in remedying this gap in the literature. It re-
veals that the threat of collective liability can result in new forms of defensive 
and offensive practices. Section 1 focuses on providers’ ex-ante incentives. It 
shows that actors can reduce their liability and increase their profits by inflat-
ing the number of actors that may be subject to group liability. Focusing on ex-
post considerations, Section 2 shows that collective liability can increase ac-
tors’ willingness to exacerbate the victim’s injury. Collective liability may even 
encourage innocent actors—those who were not responsible for the victim’s 
initial injury—to commit wrongs. Building on these insights, Section 2 turns to 
analyze the role such perverse incentives may play in civil rights violations 
cases. Section 3 illustrates how collective liability may encourage service pro-
viders, such as physicians, to induce patients to choose unnecessary, more 
dangerous, less effective, and socially undesirable procedures in ways not 
heretofore known. 
1. Increasing the Group Size 
In some cases, actors subject to a group responsibility regime may be able 
to reduce their expected liability by unnecessarily inflating the group size. To 
illustrate, consider a group with n actors (e.g., healthcare professionals) that is 
engaging in an activity (e.g., surgery) that may cause the victim an expected 
harm, D. Knowing that collective liability will apply if one member of the 
group injures the victim, the surgeon may ask additional healthcare providers 
to join the procedure. With additional h nurses, the surgeon’s expected liability 
will drop from D/n to D/(n+h). For example, with an expected harm of $100, 
adding one additional member to a four-member team would decrease the in-
dividual expected liability by 20%, from $25 (100/4) to $20 (100/5). The sur-
geon would thus be inclined to inflate the team size, even if adding more phy-
sicians and nurses is unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 113, at 275 (“Induced demand or offensive medicine 
occurs when healthcare providers pursue treatments that may not be best for the patient but offer large 
reimbursements.”); see also infra notes 147–153 and accompanying text (discussing physician-
induced demand). 
 116 See infra notes 148–152 and accompanying text (examining physician-induced demand in the 
context of obstetric medicine). 
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The example assumes that the damage is capped—that as more actors join 
the activity, the expected harm remains the same. The assumption may seem 
unrealistic at first. With more actors engaging in the activity, the probability of 
an injury, its magnitude, or both—and accordingly, the expected harm, D—
may increase. As explained below, however, this assumption, although unnec-
essary for the model, is an important feature of tort law.117 
2. Aggravating the Victim’s Injury 
a. The Law of Damages: Killing v. Injuring 
Another way actors subject to group liability can reduce their expected li-
ability is by aggravating the injury to the victim. One reason is that damages—
because of the way they are calculated—can be much higher for a severely 
injured person than for a dead victim. A number of reasons account for the 
wedge between damages awarded in the case of an injury and those awarded in 
the case of a death. To begin with, a common measure of one’s life is the value 
of one’s future earnings.118 This amount varies with the deceased’s age and 
skill, but it is quite limited—less than $1 million in half of all cases.119 By con-
trast, damages for an injured person, often due to required medical treatments 
and care during the victim’s lifetime, can be much higher.120 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Under certain circumstances, inflating the team size may be profitable even if doing so would 
increase the expected harm to the victim. For example, the surgeon would benefit from adding a fifth 
member even if the latter increases the expected harm to $110. As part of a team of five healthcare 
providers, the surgeon can expect to pay only $22 (110/5), which is less than the $25 (100/4) the sur-
geon can expect to pay as part of a group of four. See infra notes 157–159 and accompanying text. 
Although unnecessary, the assumption is realistic given, among other things, that in many states, 
damages in survival and wrongful death actions are capped irrespective of the number of defendants. 
See infra Part II.B.2.b and Example B2. 
 118 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 539, 543–44 
(2005) (explaining that in the case of a death, “[t]ort law makes damages a function of lost income” 
based on the unique attributes of the deceased and that, as a result, tort law treats adults differently 
than children, and also treats individuals who are working differently than those who are retired). 
 119 Id. at 548 (describing data that suggests that “when outliers are excluded, the tort system gen-
erally values lost lives at well under $3 million, and about half the time under $1 million” but then 
hypothesizing that “real amounts are somewhat lower”). 
 120 DOBBS, supra note 26, § 377, at 1047–53 (explaining that “[i]n personal injury cases the nor-
mal remedy is compensatory damages, awarded in a lump-sum, for all losses that have proximately 
resulted from the tort and all losses that will so result in the future,” including loss of earnings, medi-
cal expenses (such as diagnostics tests, drugs, and medical devices), pain and suffering, and emotional 
distress); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 
83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 918 n.61 (1989) (“Modern medical care, however, has created the truly cata-
strophic event—survival from injury in debilitated condition and in need of continuing, expensive 
medical attention. These injuries claim the highest recoveries.”); Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. 
White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 
199, 205 (1991) (“The severity measure is a key determinant of the damage award if the defendant is 
found negligent at trial. Patients who suffer permanent total disability have higher future medical care 
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Another reason for the wedge is that, compared to an injured victim, in 
the case of a death, certain types of damages are not awarded, and others are 
capped. For example, survival actions (for injuries to the deceased) and wrong-
ful death actions (for loss of support to the deceased’s family) provide a much 
lower compensation compared to what a living victim can receive.121 In addi-
tion, most states do not allow the plaintiff in a wrongful death action to recover 
punitive damages—damages that would be awarded to living victims.122 Some 
of these states also exclude recovery of the deceased’s (but not a living vic-
tim’s) pain and suffering.123 Others, like Texas, cap recovery in specific types 
of cases, such as those involving the death of a patient in a medical malpractice 
case.124 
                                                                                                                           
costs and more lost income than patients who suffer permanent partial disability, so the hospital’s 
expected liability is higher. For patients who die, future medical care costs are zero, so the hospital’s 
expected liability is lower in cases involving death than in cases involving permanent total disabil-
ity.”); Walter Simmons & Rosemarie Emanuele, Male and Female Recoveries in Medical Cases, 62 
REV. SOC. ECON. 83, 87 (2004) (analyzing data of closed medical malpractice claims from the Michi-
gan Bureau of Health Services between 1986 and 1991 and finding that “[p]laintiffs who suffered 
permanent major and grave injuries were awarded larger damages than death cases, because of the 
higher opportunity cost of lost wages and future medical costs”); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for 
Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 284–
85, 287–90 (1998) (finding, for example, that “the median award” in sampled New York medical 
malpractice cases “was $9,644,460 [for grave injuries], but the median award when death occurred 
was $1,076,441, almost nine times smaller” and illustrating several New York medical malpractice 
cases where jury awards to injured-but-surviving plaintiff-patients totaled in the tens of millions of 
dollars); see also Juliette Gillespie, Top 20 Personal Injury Awards, LAW.COM (Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2020/09/28/personal-injury-top-20/?slreturn=20201120222406 
[https://perma.cc/8Z7X-X7UC] (reporting that six (or 30%) of the top twenty personal injury (verdicts 
and settlements) granted in New Jersey between August 20, 2019 and September 20, 2020 were medi-
cal malpractice cases involving severe injuries with awards ranging from $5 million to $12.5 million 
and an average of $7.83 million). 
 121 See 1 PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 5:10, at 362 (2020 ed.) (explaining that the 
wrongful death actions by and large do not allow for recovery of punitive damages); DOBBS, supra 
note 26, §§ 294, 296, at 803–05 (discussing wrongful death and survival actions and explaining that 
“[d]amages in . . . survival action[s] are often quite limited in amount”). Survival actions allow the 
decedent’s estate to recover damages the victim incurred, such as pain and suffering and medical bills 
incurred while the victim was still alive and income lost between the injury and death. Wrongful death 
actions are intended to compensate family members for the injury they suffered as a result of the vic-
tim’s death. They include compensation for their grief, loss of advice and parental care, and loss of 
income they would have received from the deceased. Both actions were not recognized in common 
law and are the result of statutory amendments. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 294, at 803–05. 
 122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1979); DOBBS, supra note 26, 
§ 294, at 803–04. Alabama is the only state that restricts recovery in wrongful death actions to puni-
tive damages only. See, e.g., S. & N. Ala. R.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272, 278–79 (1877) (interpret-
ing Alabama’s wrongful death statute to permit a decedent’s estate to recover punitive damages). 
 123 For limitation on damages in survival actions, see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
3110 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (2020). 
 124 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2019) (limiting liability against physi-
cians and healthcare providers for non-economic damages to $250,000 per claimant); id. § 74.303 
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The result is that “[p]laintiffs suing on behalf of a [deceased] victim who 
ha[d] no future income, no dependents, and no spouse, and who die[d] without 
feeling pain, should ordinarily receive zero damages or damages sufficient on-
ly to cover funeral expenses.”125 In these states, for the injurers, a dead victim 
may “cost” much less than a living victim. The result is an incentive to kill 
those who are severely injured.126 
b. Collective Liability Regimes & Perverse Incentives to Kill 
The limit on damages in cases involving a death provides a perverse in-
centive to kill in all cases, but its impact is more prominent in collective liabil-
ity cases. To see the effect of the law of damages on parties’ actions, consider a 
case like Ybarra, but assume that during the operation, the parties realize that 
the victim is severely injured, likely due to malpractice that would give rise to 
res ipsa. In such a case, if the parties believe that they will be subject to collec-
tive liability, each of the n actors will expect to pay 1/n of the damage, D1, or 
D1/n. Suppose also that if the victim dies, the parties will be held liable for a 
reduced amount of damages, D2 (D2<D1). Unless the parties are able to excul-
pate themselves, each would be better off if the victim dies. In such a case, 
their collective and individual expected liability would be reduced from D1/n 
to D2/n. For example, in the case of a team with n=4 members where compen-
sation for an injured victim is expected to be D1=$12 million, but for a dead 
                                                                                                                           
(capping healthcare providers’ total liability—including economic and non-economic damages (but 
excluding medical expenses)—to $500,000 per claimant). Both caps apply in wrongful death and 
survival action claims. See, e.g., Rio Grande Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Villarreal, 329 S.W.3d 594, 627–28 
(Tex. App. 2010) (observing that, in Texas, “any damage award will be limited by applying the 
[$250,000] non-economic damage cap in section 74.301, and then will further be limited by applying 
the total [$500,000] cap of section 74.303” (quoting Jeff Waters, Better to Kill Than To Maim: The 
Current State of Medical Malpractice Wrongful Death Cases in Texas, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 760 
(2008))), rev. granted by Tex. App.–Corpus Christi (Dec. 16, 2011), judgment vacated, case dismissed 
by agreement (Aug. 20, 2013). 
 125 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 118, at 544. 
 126 See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio Cnty. Hosp. Corp., 295 S.W.3d 104, 109–10 (Ky. 2009). The issue in 
Martin v. Ohio County Hospital Corp. was whether a surviving spouse could be compensated for a 
loss of consortium that occurred after the death of her injured spouse. Id. at 107. In taking an expan-
sive view, the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained the importance of fully compensating victims: 
[A]llowing a loss of consortium claim only if the victim survives would appear to give 
perverse incentives to potential tortfeasors. Such a rule could create incentives to kill 
victims instead of leaving them disabled, as only by instantly killing the victim can the 
tortfeasor be guaranteed to owe no loss of consortium damages. 
Id. at 109–10 (emphasis added); see also Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 843–44 (S.D. 
Fla. 1983) (holding that under Florida law, “it would be far more profitable to kill the plaintiff than to 
scratch him” and finding such a result inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the purpose of which is “to 
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law”). 
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victim, D2=$1 million, killing the victim would reduce the expected liability 
for each actor from $3 million (12M/4) to $250,000 (1M/4).127 
The incentive to kill is exacerbated if some members of the group are 
worried that others could exculpate themselves. In the above example, if three 
members believe that the fourth will be exempted from liability, the expected 
liability of each will increase from $3 million (12M/4) to $4 million (12M/3), 
and so will their inclination to aggravate the victim’s injuries. 
Collective liability thus puts innocent actors in a tough (if not impossible) 
position. Those actors must choose between (a) being wronged in the sense 
that they must pay for a harm they did not inflict or (b) committing a wrong—
killing a patient—to reduce their own liability. In other words, a group ac-
countability regime may encourage innocent actors to engage in wrongdoing. 
Moreover, in collective liability cases, the risk that a maimed victim will 
be killed is higher and increases with the number of actors in the group. The 
victim’s life will be spared only if all actors—each of whom has the incentive 
to kill the victim—avoid doing so. The incentive to kill may also result in col-
lusion to kill and the suppression of information ex post (the subject of Subpart 
C below). 
Collective liability regimes exacerbate the concern that actors may suc-
cumb to the (law’s) pressure and kill the victim for another reason. Some juris-
dictions mandate a damage cap in wrongful death and survival actions that 
cannot be adjusted upward with the number of defendants.128 The effect of 
such caps is that killing a patient is not only cheaper compared to injuring that 
patient, but that individual liability is also diluted when collective responsibil-
ity is imposed. Texas law, for example, provides such a perverse incentive. In 
                                                                                                                           
 127 For anecdotal evidence regarding willingness to kill, see Michael Daly, FBI: Texas Hospice 
Boss Texted Nurses Execution Orders for Patients, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.the
dailybeast.com/fbi-texas-hospice-boss-texted-nurses-execution-orders-for-patients [https://perma.cc/
N3UR-LQM5] (reporting that according to the FBI, “[t]he founder and CEO of a hospice services 
company instructed nurses to administer fatal overdoses to patients” in order to increase profits); Ste-
ve Doughty, Top Doctor’s Chilling Claim: The NHS Kills Off 130,000 Elderly Patients Every Year, 
DAILY MAIL (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2161869/Top-doctors-
chilling-claim-The-NHS-kills-130-000-elderly-patients-year.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2020
1017125706/https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2161869/Top-doctors-chilling-claim-The-
NHS-kills-130-000-elderly-patients-year.html] (arguing that “NHS doctors are prematurely ending the 
lives of thousands of elderly hospital patients”); see also infra notes 139–144 and accompanying text 
(discussing how a federal court considered California’s wrongful death statute to have created an incen-
tive to kill because the state law limited recovery to losses sustained prior to death and excluded non-
economic damages). 
 128 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210(2) (2020) (capping recovery for noneconomic damages 
against healthcare providers in wrongful death and survival actions “irrespective of the number of 
defendants”); Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 202, 214 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (affirming the trial 
court’s decision which reduced a $9.2 million jury verdict in a wrongful death action to less than $2 
million due to Missouri’s cap on noneconomic damages). 
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the case of a patient’s death, liability for non-economic harm is limited to 
$250,000 and liability for all damages to $500,000.129 Importantly, these caps 
remain constant “regardless of the number of . . . health care providers.”130 By 
contrast, damages for an injured person are not capped at all.131 The result is a 
strong incentive to kill, rather than merely to maim, the injured patient.132 
c. Collective Liability and Civil Rights Violations 
The last insight carries an important message to other areas of the law, 
chief among them are suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.133 Courts adjudicat-
ing these suits have been wary about the perverse effect of tort law’s damage 
calculation. However, they have failed to recognize that in cases involving 
multiple actors, the incentive to kill an injured victim is substantially higher 
than in those involving a single agent.134 Moreover, in such cases, even fully 
compensating the victim would not thwart the pressure to kill. This subsection 
explains how collective liability may contribute to constitutional rights viola-
tions and offers a new way to remedy its adverse effects. 
Derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, § 1983 creates a cause of 
action for constitutional rights violations.135 One of its primary goals is to “de-
ter racial killing” by officials.136 While federal law creates a cause of action, 
the actual amount recoverable in a § 1983 suit is dependent on state law and, 
                                                                                                                           
 129 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301, 74.303(a) (West 2019). The $500,000 cap 
applies to economic, noneconomic, and exemplary damages. Texas law defines economic damages as 
compensatory damages and noneconomic damages as non-pecuniary damages, including “physical 
pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of consortium . . . loss of companion-
ship, loss of enjoyment of life [and] injury to reputation.” Id. §§ 41.001(4), (12); 74.001(6). 
 130 Id. § 74.303(a) (emphasis added). 
 131 Id. § 74.303(c). 
 132 To illustrate the effect of Texas law on healthcare incentives, consider again the group of four 
healthcare providers who become aware of the victim’s injury during a surgical procedure. Recall that 
an injured victim would be entitled to D1=$10 million but a dead victim to only D2=$2 million. Sup-
pose also that in case of a death, of the $2 million award, $1.7 million are for non-economic damages 
(e.g., pain and suffering). Under Texas law, liability would be first reduced to $550,000—$250,000 
being the maximum allowance for noneconomic harm and the additional $300,000 (2M-1.7M). Due to 
the total cap requirement, this liability would be further limited to $500,000. This means that killing 
the patient would reduce each actor’s expected liability from $2.5 million (10M/4) to $125,000 
(500K/4). Individual liability can be further reduced if the size of the team is inflated (e.g., with n=5, 
each can expect to pay only $100,000). See Rio Grande Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Villarreal, 329 S.W.3d 
594, 627 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that in wrongful death and survival actions, both the noneco-
nomic and total recovery caps apply), rev. granted by Tex. App.–Corpus Christi (Dec. 16, 2011), 
judgment vacated, case dismissed by agreement (Aug. 20, 2013). 
 133 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 134 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258–59 (1978). 
 135 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 136 Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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specifically, the state’s survival and wrongful death statutes.137 Federal law, 
however, allows courts in § 1983 suits to override state law if it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution.138 And this is exactly what courts do when they have 
expressed concern that state survival laws incentivize actors to kill.139 
An example is Guyton v. Phillips.140 Guyton involved two undercover po-
lice officers who shot and killed an unarmed fourteen-year-old black boy. The 
incident began when the two officers suspected that the victim and another 
black man were either “dirty or going to rip [a nearby] car off.”141 At one 
point, a car chase ensued. It ended when the plainclothes officers rammed their 
unmarked vehicle into the victim’s car. One of the officers shot and injured the 
victim, who then attempted to escape on foot. After a short pursuit, the victim 
was captured, but before he was handcuffed, he was shot again, this time in his 
back. The gunshots were fatal. Although the police officers’ testimonies were 
inconsistent, it was clear that they did not see any weapon in the victim’s pos-
session, did not observe any threatening gestures, and did not attempt to stop 
the victim by way of warning. 
The court held that the police officers’ use of deadly force was excessive 
and unreasonable. It then held that California’s survival statute was incon-
sistent with the goals of § 1983.142 The California statute limited damages to 
losses that the decedent sustained prior to his death and excluded non-
economic damages.143 It therefore did not allow recovery of pre-death pain and 
suffering and post-death funeral fees. These constraints, the court reasoned, 
would result in a perverse incentive to kill: 
The clear purpose of § 1983 is . . . [h]ardly served when the police 
officer who acts without justification suffers a harsher penalty for 
                                                                                                                           
 137 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 138 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
 139 See infra notes 140–144 and accompanying text (describing a court’s uneasiness with laws 
incentivizing actors to kill); see also Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1104 (holding that California’s “prohibi-
tion against pre-death pain and suffering awards for a decedent’s estate has the perverse effect of 
making it more economically advantageous for a defendant to kill rather than injure his victim”); Bell, 
746 F.2d at 1239 (declining to follow Wisconsin law in a case involving the shooting of a black driver 
and a cover-up attempt by his colleague, explaining that if Wisconsin law—which would preclude 
recovery for the decedent’s loss of life—applied, “deterrence would be further subverted since it 
would be more advantageous to the unlawful actor to kill rather than injure”); Heath v. City of Hiale-
ah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (in a case involving the shooting and killing of a black 
victim by an off-duty policeman and a cover-up conspiracy, the court held that Florida’s wrongful 
death statute is inconsistent with the deterrence rationale of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because otherwise “it 
would be far more profitable to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him”). 
 140 Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1166–67. 
 143 Id. at 1164, 1166–67. 
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injuring or maiming a victim than for killing him. The court must be 
able to fashion a remedy that will . . . serve as a deterrent to abusive 
conduct in the future.144 
The analysis in this Section supports the overruling of state law when it 
undercompensates victims in § 1983 cases. But this Article does more than 
that. It also proposes a new basis for overruling state law in civil rights actions. 
The Article reveals that even when state law fully compensates the victim, 
those acting under the color of law may still have a perverse incentive to kill 
when damages cannot increase with the number of actors. To avoid such a per-
verse effect, punitive damages—or other anti-dilution devices—must be intro-
duced. Currently, however, the majority of states do not allow the plaintiff in a 
wrongful death suit to recover punitive damages.145 Those states that do allow 
punitive damages often impose arbitrary limitations or base allocation of such 
damages on fault.146 
3. Actors’ Induced Demand 
Another well-documented form of offensive practice is supplier-induced 
demand.147 In the medical context, physician-induced demand (PID) is defined 
as cases in which “the physician influences a patient’s demand for care against 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. at 1167. The court awarded the plaintiff a sum of $100,000 for the deprivation of the con-
stitutional right to life, $15,000 for pain and suffering, $487 for funeral expenses, and a total of 
$85,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1169. 
 145 One exception is Alabama’s wrongful death statute. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (2020). The statute 
has been interpreted to allow only recovery of punitive damages. See Trott v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So. 2d 
81, 84 (Ala. 2007) (holding that “the only recoverable damages [in a wrongful death action] are puni-
tive damages intended to punish the tortfeasor for its actions—not to compensate the plaintiff” and 
adding that “Medical expenses . . . are compensatory in nature and are not recoverable by a plaintiff in 
a wrongful-death action”); 1 ALA. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CIV. 11.28 (3d ed. 2018) (“The damages in 
[wrongful death cases] are punitive and not compensatory”). As such, it has the potential to deter 
actors from killing injured victims. See S. & N. Ala. R.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272, 278–79 (1877) 
(explaining that Alabama law is designed “to give greater security to human life [and] ‘to prevent 
homicides’”). 
 146 See, e.g., Gen. Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. 1993); see also 1 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE 2D, supra note 121, § 5:10, at 365–69 (discussing limitations 
where punitive damages are allowed in wrongful death actions). 
 147 See, e.g., Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect 
Medical Treatment and Patient Health?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320, 1347 (2014) (“find[ing] that 
financial incentives significantly influence physicians’ supply of health care”); Victor R. Fuchs, The 
Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations, 13 J. HUM. RES. 35, 35 (1978) (finding “consid-
erable support for the hypothesis that surgeons shift the demand for operations”); Thomas H. Rice & 
Roberta J. Labelle, Do Physicians Induce Demand for Medical Services?, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 587, 588 (1989) (explaining that “there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that physicians do 
induce demand for economic gain”). 
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the physician’s interpretation of the best interests of the patient.”148 The choice 
between giving birth via a C-section or a vaginal delivery provides a good ex-
ample. For low-risk patients, vaginal delivery is considered the preferred op-
tion.149 Yet, many empirical studies now show that physicians perform many 
unnecessary C-sections.150 Some scholars focus on the cost side of the equa-
tion. They blame the doctor’s choice on “defensive medicine”—the doctor’s 
interest in reducing her expected liability.151 Others focus on the monetary 
benefits the physician receives from the activity, arguing that the incentives to 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Erin Johnson & M. Marit Rehavi, Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives 
in Childbirth, 8 AM. ECON. J. 115, 119 (2016) (quoting Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 461, 504 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000)) 
(explaining that patients who are not in a position to evaluate alternative treatments may be persuaded 
by doctors to take a course of action that is less desirable to the patient but is more profitable to the 
healthcare provider); see Roger Feldman & Frank Sloan, Competition Among Physicians, Revisited, 
13 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 239, 239 (1988) (defining physician induced demand as “whether the 
demand curve for physician services is subject to shifts induced by physicians in pursuit of their own 
interests”). 
 149 Joanne Spetz et al., Physician Incentives and the Timing of Cesarean Sections: Evidence from 
California, 39 MED. CARE 536, 537 (2001) (explaining that “Cesarean section [C-section] delivery is 
normally precipitated by one or more medical conditions”); HENRI GOER ET AL., VAGINAL OR CE-
SAREAN BIRTH: WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR WOMEN AND BABIES? 4 (Childbirth Connection 2012), 
https://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/health-care/maternity/vaginal-or-cesarean-
birth-what-is-at-stake.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RL8-477V] (“Overuse of cesarean delivery in low-risk 
women exposes more women and babies to potential harms of cesarean with minimal likelihood of 
benefit.”). 
 150 There is evidence that for-profit hospitals are more likely to perform unnecessary C-sections, 
implying that the benefits from C-sections are high or that the costs (including the risk of litigation) 
are low enough (or both) to justify many unnecessary procedures. See, e.g., Janet Currie & W. Bentley 
MacLeod, Diagnosing Expertise: Human Capital, Decision Making and Performance Among Physi-
cians, 35 J. LAB. ECON. 1, 3, 15 (2016) (noting that “the C-section is the most common surgical pro-
cedure in the United States” and that “there is widespread recognition that C-section rates vary across 
hospitals in ways that cannot be explained either by the condition of the patients or by their prefer-
ences”); Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes, 
123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 803 (2008) [hereinafter Currie & MacLeod, First Do No Harm?] (estimating that 
“unnecessary C-sections contribute as much as four billion dollars a year in excessive healthcare 
costs, as well as in inflicting unnecessary surgery on million[s] of mothers”); Tara Haelle, Your Big-
gest C-Section Risk May Be Your Hospital, CONSUMER REPS. (May 10, 2018), https://www.consumer
reports.org/c-section/biggest-c-section-risk-may-be-your-hospital/ [https://perma.cc/FS6Q-733K] 
(reporting that “C-section rates for low-risk deliveries in the [United States] vary dramatically from 
hospital to hospital, even between those located in the same communities” and that “almost half of the 
C-sections performed in the [United States] are not required” and “can pose added risks to the mother 
and her child”). 
 151 See, e.g., Clark T. Johnson & Erika F. Werner, The Nationwide Relationship Between Mal-
practice Rates of Vaginal and Cesarean Delivery, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 119S, 120S 
(2014) (“States with higher malpractice rates have lower vaginal delivery rates and higher cesarean 
delivery rates than states with lower malpractice rates.”); Y. Tony Yang et al., Relationship Between 
Malpractice Litigation Pressure and Rates of Cesarean Section and Vaginal Birth After Cesarean 
Section, 47 MED. CARE 234, 234 (2009) (“[R]educed litigation pressure would likely lead to decreases 
in the total number [of] cesarean sections and total delivery costs.”). 
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engage in the less desirable activity (e.g., C-sections) are hard to resist.152 
However, all agree that asymmetric information plays an important role. The 
authors of a recent study explain that the “PID [hypothesis] posits that physi-
cians can shift patient demand and move treatment quantity in the direction of 
their own interests because patients do not have the necessary medical 
knowledge to make independent decisions.”153 
 The following subsections explore the role of collective liability in induc-
ing demand—an area of research that remains under-studied. These subsec-
tions show that physicians may prefer to perform an unnecessary and potential-
ly harmful procedure if it is more likely to result in collective liability. Begin-
ning with the cost side, subsection a shows that such unnecessary procedures 
may reduce the physician’s exposure to liability. Subsection b reveals that the 
incentive to choose the unnecessary procedure remains strong even when the 
probability that collective liability would apply is low. Subsection c focuses on 
the benefits to physicians from procedures that are more likely to result in col-
lective liability. It shows that such benefits may exacerbate the physician’s in-
centives to perform unnecessary procedures. 
a. The Costs of Unnecessary and Harmful Services 
As this subsection shows, collective liability regimes such as res ipsa may 
encourage physician-induced demand of the worst type. For example, in the 
medical context, the very existence of a collective liability regime may incen-
tivize physicians to choose an unnecessary procedure that involves full anes-
thesia over one that does not. The reason is that, in some cases, by choosing a 
procedure that will be more likely to subject parties to collective res ipsa, a 
physician can reap a higher payoff due to res ipsa’s cost-sharing feature. Ex-
ample B1 below is illustrative. 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See, e.g., Nathanael Johnson, For-Profit Hospitals Performing More C-Sections, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 13, 2010), https://khn.org/news/californiawatch-profit-hospitals-performing-
more-c-sections/ [https://perma.cc/D9M2-A4DL] (“A database compiled from state birthing records 
revealed that, all factors considered, women are at least 17[%] more likely to have a cesarean section 
at a for-profit hospital than at one that operates as a non-profit. A surgical birth can bring in twice the 
revenue of a vaginal delivery.”); Shankar Vedantam, Money May Be Motivating Doctors to Do More 
C-Sections, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/08/
30/216479305/money-may-be-motivating-doctors-to-do-more-c-sections [https://perma.cc/Y7TE-
8KLA]. Non-monetary benefits also play a role. See, e.g., Erin Johnson, Physician Induced Demand, 
in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 77, 80 (2014) (reviewing the literature and noting that 
“[s]tudies of labor and delivery also suggest that obstetricians sometimes perform C-sections for their 
own convenience”); Spetz et al., supra note 149, at 537 (hypothesizing that “physicians have an incen-
tive to provide cesarean sections to maximize leisure”). 
 153 Johnson & Rehavi, supra note 148, at 116. 
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Example B1: A physician must choose between two procedures. 
The cost of performing the procedures and the utility therefrom are 
the same. However, the procedures differ in the risk they pose to the 
patient and the payoffs to the healthcare provider. 
 The expected harm to the patient is lower from Activity-I (e.g., a 
vaginal delivery) compared to Activity-II (e.g., a C-section). The id-
iosyncratic costs and benefits to the patient can be estimated ex ante 
by the healthcare provider, but they cannot be easily discerned ex 
post by the factfinder.154 Accordingly, the physician and the physi-
cian’s team are unlikely to be held liable for simply choosing Activi-
ty-II over Activity-I (although they should be).155 
 Although the physician and the physician’s team will (likely) not 
be held liable for choosing one action over the other, they will be li-
able if they fail to meet the standard of care expected in each activi-
ty (e.g., if an actor causes a uterine rupture during a vaginal delivery 
or leaves a sponge inside the patient during a C-section). 
Collective liability can encourage the wealth-maximizing doctor to prefer 
the less socially desirable Activity-II. To see why, consider first a case where 
the physician operates alone, and assume for the moment that the physician’s 
benefits from the two activities are identical. Suppose Activity-I comes with an 
expected liability of $10 and Activity-II with an expected liability of $16. 
When liability is imposed on one party, the patient’s and the physician’s inter-
ests are aligned. The physician would prefer to engage in Activity-I (10<16)—
the socially desirable activity. 
Consider now the effect of the application of collective res ipsa on a phy-
sician who works with another healthcare provider (for example, a nurse). Res 
ipsa is more likely to apply in suits involving Activity-II (C-section) because in 
such cases the control requirement is satisfied.156 Thus, so long as the accident 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id. at 119–20. 
 155 See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text (discussing physician induced demand for C-
sections and reviewing studies indicating that vaginal deliveries are associated with higher rates of 
medical malpractice suits even though the procedure generally poses less risk to most patients); see 
also Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 120 (2011) (investigating the effect of 
individual liability and concluding that a physician is unlikely to be held liable “even if he negligently 
chooses the cesarean procedure”); Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243, 264–65 
(2007) [hereinafter Porat, Offsetting Risks] (noting that “cesarean deliveries are performed in the Unit-
ed States at a much higher than optimal rate” and explaining that this is likely due “to defensive medi-
cine”).While Porat finds that when liability is individual “[l]owering physician liability would de-
crease defensive medicine,” this Article shows that, when collective liability applies, under certain 
circumstances, increasing the expected liability of each actor may be more effective. Porat, Offsetting 
Risks, supra, at 265. 
 156 Compared to a vaginal delivery, in a C-section, patients may be unconscious or semi-
conscious and thus likely to have less access to information about what happened during delivery. 
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“bespeaks of negligence,” both healthcare providers would be held liable for 
the entire harm. As a result, the physician can expect to pay only $8 if the phy-
sician chooses Activity-II (16/2) and $10 if the physician chooses Activity-I. 
Now, the interests of the patient and the healthcare providers diverge. In Ex-
ample B1, collective res ipsa incentivizes the physician to take the less effi-
cient course of action. 
Collective liability may also encourage physicians to choose the less de-
sirable activity even if the harm increases with the number of actors. To see 
this, consider the following variant of Example B1: 
Example B2: A physician must choose between two procedures. 
The expected liability associated with each activity and the benefits 
therefrom to the parties are the same. Specifically, assume that in 
each activity the physician expects to benefit $100 and inflict a harm 
of $60, whereas the nurse expects to benefit $30 and inflict a harm 
of $10. 
 Activity-I, where each actor is subject to individual liability, comes with 
an expected gain of $40 (100-60) to the physician and $20 (30-10) to the nurse. 
Once again, a collective liability regime, such as res ipsa, may incentivize the 
physician to switch to the less desirable (in fact, tortious) Activity-II. As part of 
a team of two, the physician can expect to pay $35 (70/2) and gain $65 (100-
35). However, If the physician is joined by four nurses (thereby raising the ex-
pected harm to the victim from 70 to 100),157 the physician’s expected payoffs 
from Activity-II would increase. The physician can expect a gain of $80—the 
difference between the physician’s $100 benefit and her $20 portion of the 
damage ((60+10x4)/5).158 The result is an unnecessary procedure with an ex-
orbitant number of healthcare providers. The hospital—often the employer of 
the assisting staff—would also benefit from the unnecessary procedure if its 
proceeds from Activity-II are higher compared to Activity-I.159 
                                                                                                                           
 157 The expected harm is $70 (60+10) when the team includes one doctor and one nurse and $100 
(60+10x4) when the team is comprised of one doctor and four nurses. 
 158 This assumes that res ipsa would apply to the aggregate $100 (60+10x4) harm. The assump-
tion is later relaxed. Each nurse can expect a gain of $10 (30-(60+10x4)/5). 
 159 This may be the case in C-sections. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, Physician 
Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery, 27 RAND J. ECON. 99, 100 (1996) (arguing 
“that declining fertility increased the income pressure on ob/gyns and led them to substitute from 
normal childbirth toward a more highly reimbursed alternative: cesarean delivery”); Johnson & Reha-
vi, supra note 148, at 117 (reviewing literature which reports that “Cesarean birth ends up being a 
profit center in hospitals, so there’s not a lot of incentive to reduce them” (quoting Lisa Girion, More 
Cesareans, More Problems, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
2009-may-17-fi-cover-birth17-story.html [https://perma.cc/38RG-QNBR])). In 1989, “the average 
charge for a C-section (including both physician and hospital components) was $2,850 greater than 
the average charge for a vaginal delivery.” Emmett B. Keeler & Mollyann Brodie, Economic Incen-
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b. The Rate of Res Ipsa 
The analysis above ignores the rate at which res ipsa applies in Activity-II 
cases—and for a good reason. Even if res ipsa applies in only a fraction of Ac-
tivity-II cases, say 1%, the actors’ monetary incentive to engage in the tortious 
activity could remain strong.160 Of course, the higher the rate—implying that 
more unnecessary actions are taken, resulting in accidents that bespeak negli-
gence—the higher the gain to the physician. 
c. The Benefits from Unnecessary and Harmful Services 
The previous variants of Example B1 focus on the cost side of the actors’ 
calculus while keeping the benefit from the activities constant. In many cases, 
however, the benefits associated with different activities are heterogeneous. An 
investigation of the impact of these benefits reveals that they, with the help of a 
collective liability theory like res ipsa, may exacerbate the incentive to steer pa-
tients to less desirable procedures. Once again, the choice between C-sections 
and vaginal deliveries provides a good example. Compared to vaginal deliver-
ies, C-sections are more profitable to the hospital and, in many cases, to the 
                                                                                                                           
tives in the Choice Between Vaginal Delivery and Cesarean Section, 71 MILBANK Q. 365, 365 (1993). 
By 1999, the average difference charge for hospitals alone was estimated at $4,360. See H. Shelton 
Brown III, Lawsuit Activity, Defensive Medicine, and Small Area Variation: The Case of Cesarean 
Sections Revisited, 2 HEALTH ECON., POL’Y & L. 285, 286 (2007). 
 160 With some simplifying assumptions, it is easy to show that, despite a low rate of res ipsa, the 
physician would prefer the less desirable (and tortious) activity. By denoting biMD as the benefit to the 
physician MD from activity i, it is possible to express the physician’s profit function from Activity-II 
(the left-hand side in Equation 1) relative to Activity-I (the right-hand side in Equation 1), as follows: 
(1)  
 
where n is the number of actors, t is the rate of res ipsa, Dij is the expected liability faced by actor j 
from activity i (i.e., D1MD is the physician’s expected liability from Activity-I), and ∑D is the total 
expected liability from Activity-II. Rearranging the expression and assuming, as does Example B2, 




Equation 2 implies that, so long as the expected harm inflicted by the physician in Activity-II, D2MD, is 
higher than the average expected harm, ∑D/n, (the tortious) Activity-II would remain more profitable 
to the physician. To illustrate, recall that in Example B2 with four nurses the expected gain to the 
physician from Activity-II is $80 (100-(60+10x4)/5) when res ipsa applies and $40 (100-60) other-
wise. With a res ipsa rate of t=1%, the physician’s expected gain is $40.4 (1%x80+99%x40). Each 
nurse can expect a gain of $19.9 (1%x(30-(60+10x4)/5)+99%x(30-10)). 
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physicians performing the procedure.161 They also take less time to perform, 
implying that a vaginal delivery comes with an even higher opportunity cost to 
the actors.162 To explore the impact of the benefit calculus, suppose that in Ex-
ample B1, the team comprises two physicians, MD1 and MD2, whose ex-
pected payoffs from the two activities are described in Table 1 below. 
 Activity I Activity II 
 Benefit Harm Gain Benefit Harm Gain 
MD1 100 30 70 200 150 50 
MD2 100 20 80 400 50 350 
Table 1: The Parties’ Expected Payoffs from the Different Activities 
Activity-I promises an expected gain of $70 (100-30) to MD1 and $80 
(100-20) to MD2. Activity-II promises a gain of $50 (200-150) to MD1 and 
$350 (400-50) to MD2. Without a cost-sharing doctrine like res ipsa, MD1 
would not agree to engage in (the less desirable) Activity-II (70>50). But if res 
ipsa applies in Activity-II cases, both actors would be better off if they engage 
in Activity-II rather than Activity-I. In such a case, MD1 can expect to gain 
$100 (200-(150+50)/2) and MD2 can expect $300 (400-(150+50)/2).163 
C. The Information Extraction Fallacy 
The second justification for applying collective liability is to extract in-
formation from a group of actors that would identify the wrongdoer.164 The 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Currie & MacLeod, First Do No Harm?, supra note 150, at 803 (explaining that “[o]ne reason 
for high rates of C-sections is that fees for C-sections are roughly double fees for normal deliveries” 
and reviewing the literature showing that “physicians are responsive to the incentives created by dif-
ferentials between fees for vaginal births and Caesarean births”); see supra note 159 (collecting 
sources which describe the possible profit motivation behind increased rates of C-sections). 
 162 Currie & MacLeod, First Do No Harm?, supra note 150, at 797, 803; Jon Gruber et al., Physi-
cian Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of Cesarean Delivery, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 473, 475 n.2 
(1999); Gruber & Owings, supra note 159, at 102. 
 163 For reasons explained at supra note 160, this is also true if res ipsa applies only in a fraction of 
Activity-II cases. 
 164 Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944) (explaining that “the particular force and 
justice of the rule . . . consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause . . . is prac-
tically accessible to [the defendants] but inaccessible to the injured person,” and noting that “[w]ithout 
the aid of the doctrine [the victim] . . . would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and 
nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts 
establishing liability” (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2509, at 382 (3d ed. 1940))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2010) 
(explaining that collective res ipsa “provid[es] incentives to ‘smoke out’ relevant evidence” and iden-
tify the careless party); Ronald J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated: Burdens of Proof, 
Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 636 
(1994) (explaining that res ipsa allows judges to “pry information from litigants”); Res Ipsa Loquitur: 
Its Nature and Effect, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 126, 129 (1935) (“The universal justification for whatever 
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claim is that collective liability encourages innocent actors—witnesses—to 
share information that identifies the culprit. Saul Levmore illustrates this in-
formation-forcing function using a hypothetical that includes six elevator pas-
sengers.165 At one point during the ride, one of them feels that her wallet con-
taining $100 has been taken. It is clear that one of the five other passengers 
stole the wallet, but the victim cannot identify the thief, and no passenger con-
sents to a search or volunteers to identify the culprit. Collective liability would 
require the innocents and the thief to pay $20 (100/5). This, according to 
Levmore, “might encourage otherwise silent witnesses to help identify the 
chief culprit who would then bear the entire liability.”166 Levmore explains that 
the rule (collective liability) “is surprisingly similar to the famous case of 
Ybarra v. Spangard,” which he views as “shrewd, judge-made law, because of 
its information-forcing potential.”167 
This Subpart shows that the information-extraction rationale may be lim-
ited in scope and that collective liability may even lead to opposite results. To 
begin, in many cases, the parties do not have any information about the acci-
dent.168 Nor are they in a position to collect and produce ex ante such infor-
mation. Moreover, as this Subpart illustrates, even when the parties know what 
in fact happened, collective liability regimes such as res ipsa may be a poor 
mechanism to extract useful information. Section 1 begins by illustrating how 
collective liability can incentivize a party to suppress information. Section 2 
shows that collective liability may even impel the parties to provide false in-
formation. Section 3 explores cases where collective liability may incentivize 
parties to collude in order to lie and commit insurance fraud. 
1. The Witnesses’ Incentive to Suppress Information and Overinvestment 
To analyze the incentive of actors to volunteer information or invest in its 
production, consider the following example. 
                                                                                                                           
benefit res ipsa loquitur gives the plaintiff is that the defendant apparently has greater access to the 
evidence and therefore is the proper one to furnish an explanation.”); David W. Robertson, The Com-
mon Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1783 (1997) (noting that in Ybarra, the court used 
res ipsa to overcome “the hurdle presented by the defendants’ wall of silence”). 
 165 Levmore, supra note 22, at 1561 (introducing the over-extraction mechanism to incentivize 
the tortfeasor to confess the wrongdoing). 
 166 Id. at 1562. 
 167 Id. at 1562–63. 
 168 See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 533 (Cal. 1967) (noting that “Ybarra involved an 
injury which may not have been received during the operation”); DOBBS, supra note 26, § 249, at 651 
(explaining that “[h]olding all the defendants hostage would itself be a justified response if evidence 
showed that all of them had knowledge of the facts,” but noting that in Ybarra this “was not the case 
and it is inherently improbable that everyone in an operating room knows exactly what everyone else 
is doing every second of the time; at least one person’s eyes should be on the scalpel”). 
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Example C1: In breach of her duties, T, a tortfeasor, caused the vic-
tim damage, D>0. T could be a doctor in a surgery gone wrong or an 
elevator passenger who stole the victim’s wallet. W, a witness, can 
produce and share information that would shed light on the accident 
at an expected cost of c>0. This includes the cost of communicating 
the information as well as the inconvenience involved in “ratting out” 
another or the loss of colleagues’ friendship and trust.169 W garners a 
(moral) benefit, b, from identifying T and assisting the victim. 
W’s net cost from producing and communicating the information can be 
denoted by μ=c-b. When b>c (that is, when μ<0), W’s moral benefits from 
producing and sharing information outweigh the inconvenience and expected 
losses associated with such acts. In these cases, W has an internal motivation to 
produce and provide information. In other words, when μ<0, W already has a 
dominant strategy to identify T, and accordingly, the case for res ipsa is weak. 
Table 2 below describes the parties’ expected costs without a collective liabil-




(Identify T) Keep Silent 
Confess 
        T            W 
        D             μ 
        T            W 
        D             0 
Keep Silent 
        T            W 
        D             μ 
        T            W 
        0              0 
Table 2: The Actors’ Expected Costs Absent Res Ipsa Loquitur 
The more interesting case, and the one which courts need to deal with, is 
when b<c (or μ>0)—that is, when W’s moral motivation to share information 
is not strong enough. This may happen, for example, when the parties are re-
peat players, part of a close-knit group, or both (e.g., a team of doctors and 
nurses).170 In these cases, if the actors are subject to individual liability they 
would both keep silent. W would have a dominant strategy to avoid providing 
information (μ>0), and knowing this, T would not confess. As a result, the 
plaintiff would remain remediless. 
Consider now the effect of res ipsa, described in Table 3 below. If T and 
W keep silent, res ipsa will help the plaintiff prove her case against both T and 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Such non-monetary costs can be high and even prohibitive. See, e.g., 2 DAVID LOUISELL & 
HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 14.01 (2019) (discussing the stigma and retaliation 
doctors experience when they testify against others and providing examples). 
 170 See id. § 14.01. 
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W, and accordingly, each can expect to pay half of the harm, D/2 (denoted by 
the bottom right cell in Table 3 below). When 0<μ<D/2 (e.g., when D=$100 
and μ=$20), the result is a unique Nash equilibrium: W provides information 
whereas T is silent.171 In other words, res ipsa incentivizes the witness, W, to 




(Identify T) Keep Silent 
Confess         T            W 
        D            μ 
        T            W 
        D             0 
Keep Silent         T            W 
        D            μ 
        T            W 
       D/2        D/2 
Table 3: The Actors’ Expected Costs with Res Ipsa Loquitur 
But when μ>D/2, res ipsa can lead to the opposite result: collective liabil-
ity may incentivize the witness to suppress information. For example, suppose 
that W does not have an internal motivation to share information (b=0). As-
sume also that the cost of producing and sharing information is μ=c=$60, and 
that the expected damage is D=$100. In such a case, W would suppress the 
evidence because res ipsa dilutes W’s expected liability to the point that shar-
ing is too costly. In other words, W would prefer to keep silent and be held lia-
ble together with T. W would prefer an expected judgment of $50 (100/2) ra-
ther than incurring the $60 expected cost associated with turning in a col-
league. 
Moreover, even in cases in which res ipsa would incentivize W to produce 
and share information, the result may be inefficient if W is not the lowest cost 
avoider—that is, if another witness can produce and share the information at a 
lower cost. Even if W is the best cost avoider, a welfare loss may occur, and 
the loss may increase with the number of actors if multiple parties would in-
vest in producing evidence where only one should. For example, in Levmore’s 
elevator hypothetical, if each of the five passengers can invest $10 in produc-
                                                                                                                           
 171 Here, the parties do not have a dominant strategy. For example, W is better off keeping silent 
if T confesses (0<μ), but W is better off divulging information if T is silent (μ<D/2). However, a cell-
by-cell analysis reveals that T will keep silent and W will provide condemning information. The rea-
son is that neither party has an incentive to deviate and adopt a different strategy (if W shares infor-
mation, T does not have an incentive to confess—either way, T will pay D, and if T keeps silent, W is 
better off sharing information because μ<D/2). Note that if one assumes that when T is silent, an adju-
dication process will impose some additional cost on T, it is impossible to tell what the parties will do 
(i.e., there is no Nash equilibrium). The possibility that the parties will lie (i.e., that W will confess to 
something she did not do, and that T will falsely blame W) is investigated in Sections 2 and 3 below. 
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ing and keeping exculpatory evidence, res ipsa may incentivize each to do so 
(10<100/5). As a result, evidence that can be produced at a cost of $10 would 
be produced at a cost of $50 (10x5). 
To date, the claim that collective liability can serve as an effective infor-
mation-forcing mechanism has not been proven empirically. This Article 
shows that the theory supporting its information-extraction ability is also lack-
ing and overly optimistic. In some cases, collective liability regimes such as 
res ipsa can incentivize witnesses to suppress information. In other cases, col-
lective liability may encourage them to produce and communicate information, 
but inefficiently so. 
2. The Blame Game 
The second justification for collective liability—that, in some cases, it 
may incentivize actors to produce information—relies on an empirical assump-
tion: that W can corroborate W’s account using objective evidence that would 
make W’s testimony more likely than that of the injurer. For example, in a sur-
gery gone wrong, W may be able to prove T’s carelessness by providing rec-
ords showing that T used the wrong type of clamp or by furnishing the clamp T 
used. In the elevator hypothetical, W may be able to provide information that 
would lead to the victim’s wallet and place it within T’s possession. In such 
cases, if T lies, T would not only have to compensate the victim but would also 
incur litigation costs, which makes lying a losing strategy. By contrast, if W 
only knows what happened but is unable to provide corroborating evidence, 
W’s account would be as likely as T’s. In these cases, a collective liability re-
gime such as res ipsa may indeed break the “conspiracy of silence,” but would 
result in the production of false information.172 In other words, it would incen-
tivize lying. 
Courts and scholars have failed to appreciate the perverse incentive to 
supply false information.173 They focus on and laud the information-forcing 
aspect of res ipsa. But they overlook the fact that the justification for the doc-
trine, if any exists, is to encourage actors to supply (1) truthful information that 
(2) would help identify the tortfeasors.174 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See, e.g., Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1138 (Pa. 1981). 
 173 In Professor Levmore’s elevator hypothetical the concern does not arise because one of five 
passengers steals the victim’s wallet. See Levmore, supra note 22, at 1562–63. In this hypothetical, if 
the thief decides to confess wrongdoing, the thief can prove culpability using external evidence (i.e., 
by returning the wallet). Similarly, information provided by a witness can identify the true thief. 
When no external evidence exists, however, the prospects of lying loom larger. 
 174 See supra note 164 and accompanying text (reviewing the prior literature’s view of the role 
collective liability plays in information extraction). 
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Res ipsa may fail on both accounts. To illustrate, reconsider Example C1, 
but assume now that W does not have any external evidence to corroborate W’s 
account. For example, assume that in the elevator hypothetical T did not steal 
the passenger’s wallet but instead stole a $20 bill.175 Or assume that in the sur-
gery, W witnessed T’s careless behavior but is not in possession of the clamp 
that could prove T’s fault. In such cases, res ipsa may encourage the parties to 
lie. To escape liability, T could claim that W was at fault. Under certain circum-
stances (discussed in the next section), W may even falsely take responsibility 
for the careless conduct of another. Table 4 below shows the parties’ payoffs 










T            W 
D             μ 
T          W 
D           0 
T            W 
D/2         D/2 
Keep Silent 
T            W 
D             μ 
T          W 
0           0 
T            W 




T            W 
0              μ 
T          W 
0           D 
T            W 
0             D 
Table 4: The Actors’ Payoffs Without Res Ipsa Loquitur (Lying Is an Option) 
When μ<D (e.g., when D=$100 and μ=20), there are two equilibria:176 (1) 
both actors keep silent and (2) T lies when W confesses. Note that in these 
equilibria the victim cannot recover damages as each of the actors’ account is, 
by definition, equally probable.177 
By contrast, when a collective liability doctrine applies, there is only one 
equilibrium: T lies and W confesses. The reason is that when the parties keep 
silent or provide contradictory accounts (e.g., when each tries to pin liability 
on the other), both will be held liable (because res ipsa applies), and each can 
expect to pay half of the damage. As a result, when W has (or can be incentiv-
ized to produce ex ante) corroborating evidence, res ipsa may incentivize W to 
identify T. But when W does not have corroborating evidence, res ipsa incen-
tivizes T to lie, in which case the factfinder, by definition, will not be able to 
identify the true injurer. 
                                                                                                                           
 175 For simplicity, assume both T and W have a $20 bill, in which case the thief’s identity is inde-
terminable. 
 176 For T, confessing is dominated by lying (0<D/2, D), and consequently, for W, lying is domi-
nated by providing information (μ<D). 
 177 Assuming the testimonies are equally probable. 
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What courts and scholars have missed is that res ipsa is useful only if a 
witness can also corroborate her testimony with objective evidence. The reason 
is that absent res ipsa, when neither is at risk of liability, everyone is better off 
keeping silent. By contrast, when res ipsa applies, both have an incentive to 
provide information: the witness may try to exculpate herself by pinning liabil-
ity on T, and the tortfeasor will try to avoid liability by arguing that W is the 
culpable party. In other words, collective res ipsa incentivizes lying. 
Ybarra may have been such a case. On remand, all defendants testified 
“that they did not observe any incident that could have caused the injury.”178 It 
could be that all but the injurers were honest. Or, it could be that everyone lied 
because lying was each actor’s best strategy. Another possibility is that they all 
colluded to lie—the subject of the next Section.179 
3. Collusion to Lie and Suppress Evidence and Insurance (and Private 
Bargaining Over Collective Liability) 
Collective liability regimes such as res ipsa are justified as a means to 
break the defendants’ “wall of silence.”180 In practice, however, such commu-
nal liability schemes may incentivize injurers to collude with others in order to 
suppress evidence. Subsection a explains how collective liability can facilitate 
collusion, curb tortfeasors’ liability, and even shift it to innocent parties. Sub-
section b reveals that insurance can increase the risk of collusion. Subsection c 
explores self-implicating testimonies. It shows that, under certain conditions, 
actors would be willing to falsely take responsibility for an injury that they did 
not inflict. 
a. Hedging the Risks and Shifting Liability to Innocent Defendants 
To see how collective liability can benefit both the wrongdoer and those 
who witnessed the culprit, and even help co-conspirators shift liability to inno-
cent parties, consider Example C2 below: 
Example C2: In breach of her duties, T, a tortfeasor, caused the vic-
tim damage, D>0. T could be a doctor in a surgery gone wrong or an 
elevator passenger who stole from the victim. T was part of a group 
of actors that included two additional parties, W and N. The victim is 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 P.2d 445, 446 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). 
 179 See Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 200 (Utah 1990) (applying res ipsa 
after all members of the medical team denied knowing “of anything . . . that could have caused the 
burn” on the plaintiff’s thigh during a C-section). 
 180 See Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1138 (Pa. 1981); Robertson, supra 
note 164, at 1783. 
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not in a position to identify the injurer, and N does not have any ex-
ternal evidence that can identify T. 
Suppose T and W are more likely than N to be liable for the victim’s harm. 
For example, it could be that in the surgery gone wrong, T and W were the doc-
tors while N was the nurse-anesthetist, and it is more likely that a doctor 
caused the injury.181 Another example is a case where T and W, but not N, op-
erated on the plaintiff’s body part that suffered the injury.182 Or it could be that 
during an elevator ride in which money from the victim’s pocket went missing, 
T and W stood next to the victim whereas N stood farther away. 
In such cases, both T and W would be interested in the application of a 
collective liability regime such as res ipsa. Once applied, a collective liability 
regime would allow T and W to corroborate each other’s false narrative. They 
would be able—and may even collude—to argue that N, the innocent party, 
was the one at fault. If successful, both T and W would be able to exculpate 
themselves, and the innocent party would be held liable. But even if liability 
were imposed on all, T and W would still be better off. T would be required to 
pay only a fraction (1/3) of the harm T caused. And W, the innocent party, 
would be able to hedge (i.e., minimize) the risk that W would be solely liable 
for the entire harm (a false negative).183 W’s incentive to collude with T would 
be even stronger if W stood to benefit from exculpating T, for example, if the 
two were colleagues or if T paid W to present a unified front. 
Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Society provides an example of 
such a possible setting.184 Cavero involved the death of a three-year-old child 
during a tonsillectomy. The team included two doctors, a mother and son, aid-
ed by a nurse-anesthetist. The latter was employed by the hospital. In an inter-
esting turn of events, “[a]t the request of the defendant doctors[,] the court 
gave a res ipsa loquitur instruction . . . against the doctors [themselves] and the 
hospital.”185 Why would defendants ask for an inference of breach against 
themselves? Defendants may do so to hedge their risk of liability. By asking 
the court to apply res ipsa against them, they ensured that each one would pay 
a fraction of the damage, or even nothing, if the verdict against each was with-
in the insurance limit. Another reason defendants may ask a court to apply col-
lective liability against them is to shift liability to an innocent party. Under this 
                                                                                                                           
 181 The example is modeled based on Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Society. See 223 
P.2d 471 (Cal. 1950); infra notes 184–186 and accompanying text (describing the facts and outcome 
of Cavero).  
 182 The example is based on Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital. See 305 P.2d 36 (Cal. 
1956); infra notes 190–193 and accompanying text (describing the facts and outcome of Leonard). 
 183 The impact of the actors’ insurance is discussed infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 184 Cavero, 223 P.2d at 472–75. 
 185 Id. at 476 (emphasis added). 
436 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:391 
strategy, the application of res ipsa is meant to generate an initial inference of 
carelessness against all defendants—the doctors and the nurse. The defendant-
doctors could then each blame the nurse, and by corroborating each other’s 
testimonies present a unified front to exculpate themselves. In Cavero, the de-
fendants claimed that the nurse’s carelessness led to the death of the child—a 
claim the jury accepted.186 
b. The Availability of Insurance 
One would think that the actors’ insurance would dull the incentive to col-
lude. However, it is possible to show that insurance can actually increase the 
risk of collusion. Suppose, for example, that each defendant is insured up to $1 
million and the victim’s injury is $3 million.187 If liability is imposed on one 
party only, say W (due to a mistake), W can expect to pay $2 million (3-1) out 
of pocket. By contrast, if res ipsa applies and T, W, and N collude and deny 
any knowledge of what happened, each will be held liable for $1 million (3/3). 
In such a case, the defendants will not pay any damages out of pocket. Their 
insurance will fully compensate the victim. 
The interest of T and W in colluding remains even when it is expected that 
N will be able to exculpate herself. The reason, once again, is insurance fraud. 
Without res ipsa, T can expect to pay $2 million out of pocket. But if res ipsa 
applies to T and W, each can expect to pay only $500,000 out of pocket (their 
respective insurance policies will pay the remaining $2 million). The collusion 
thus allows T to reduce T’s liability from $2 million (3-1) to $500,000 and 
more than compensate W.188 
Note that collective liability provides the parties with another benefit. It 
creates a “veil of ignorance” that allows T and W to maintain their “innocence” 
(each can assert not being the truly liable party). And, at least to some extent, 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. at 472. 
 187 Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from 
Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S9, S11, S32 (2007) (noting that “[t]he conven-
tional wisdom is that most doctors buy medical malpractice policies with $1 million per-occurrence 
limits” and finding that “[o]ut-of-pocket payments are infrequent even though many physicians pur-
chase policies that are well below mean and median jury awards”); James F. Sweeney, Malpractice 
Guide, MED. ECON. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/malpractice-guide 
[https://perma.cc/4PWV-HB9K] (“In general, carriers’ standard coverage limits are $1 million per 
claim and $3 million aggregate, which is the most the policy will pay in a year for all claims.”). 
 188 For example, a promise to pay W $700,000 will make both T and W better off. T would be 
paying only $1.2 million—$500,000 to the plaintiff and $700,000 to W—which is lower than the $2 
million T would pay out of pocket if T were held solely liable. W would be subject to a $500,000 
judgment but will receive $700,000 from T, and as explained above, can avoid the stigma of a liability 
verdict by maintaining innocence despite being found liable because of a collective liability regime, 
which by definition, holds innocent parties liable. 
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mitigate the market sanctions (e.g., reputational damage) that often follow a 
liability judgment.189 
In the examples above, collusion among the insured parties allows them 
to hedge a number of risks. First, by suppressing information and committing a 
fraud against their insurance, they are able to reduce their individual exposure. 
The conspiracy allows the insured to remain within the insurance limit and 
avoid paying the victim out of their pockets. Their respective insurance com-
panies will pick up the entire bill. Second, the conspiracy is itself a form of 
insurance. It protects the innocent parties from the possibility that one of them 
will wrongly be held solely liable for the entire harm. The conspiracy also 
helps the culprit escape from fully internalizing the consequences of her negli-
gent behavior. 
c. Self-implicating Testimonies 
In Example C2 and its variants, the victim received full compensation. As 
this subsection shows, in some cases, collective liability may incentivize the 
parties to collude to reduce their expected liability at the expense of the victim. 
Consider, for example, the leading case Leonard v. Watsonville Communi-
ty Hospital.190 In Leonard, a clamp was left in the plaintiff’s abdomen during 
an operation performed by doctors Lacy and Slegal with the assistance of doc-
tor Eiskamp and the hospital’s nurse. At trial, Eiskamp’s denial of any wrong-
doing was corroborated by Lacy and Slegal, who testified that they were the 
only doctors who used the forgotten clamp.191 The court found their testimony 
to be of such compelling evidentiary power that it exempted Eiskamp from 
liability. Lacy and Slegal’s statements, the court explained, “did not in any way 
tend to benefit Lacy or Slegal.”192 Rather, the statements were “disadvanta-
geous to [Lacy and Slegal] because the exoneration of one defendant would 
have the necessary effect of increasing the possibility of liability on the part of 
each of the other defendants.”193 In other words, the court held that the doctors’ 
self-implicating testimonies should be believed, because by exempting one 
defendant (Eiskamp), each of the remaining defendants faced a higher ex-
pected liability (D/2>D/3). 
But this is not necessarily so. Self-implicating testimonies can in fact 
benefit all defendants. The Ybarra and Leonard courts were aware of the pos-
                                                                                                                           
 189 See infra Part III. 
 190 Leonard v. Watsonville Cmty. Hosp., 305 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1956). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 42. 
 193 Id. (emphasis added). 
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sibility of collusion among defendants.194 But what they did not realize was 
that their prescribed antidote—the doctrine of collective res ipsa—was itself 
instrumental in incentivizing the parties to collude and suppress evidence. In 
fact, there are reasons to suspect that in many cases, collusions do take place 
and that victims are not in a position to unravel them.195 Example C3 below 
illustrates how a collective liability regime can enable such hard-to-detect col-
lusive activity. 
Example C3: T1 and T2 are doctors who perform many operations 
together. T1 and T2 are co-defendants in two trials involving differ-
ent surgeries that resulted in injuries to patients. The subject of Tri-
al-I is a surgery in which T1’s careless behavior caused a patient 
damage, D1, under circumstances in which res ipsa applies. The sub-
ject of Trial-II is a surgery in which T2’s careless behavior caused a 
patient an injury, D2. In Trial-II res ipsa does not apply, but T1 has 
external evidence of T2’s wrongdoing. 
Suppose T1 approaches T2 and makes the following offer: “If you take 
responsibility for my actions in Trial-I, I will suppress the evidence against you 
in Trial-II.”196 Consider first the parties’ payoffs if T2 rejects the deal—that is, 
if T2 refuses to falsely take responsibility for T1’s actions in Trial-I. In such a 
case, because res ipsa applies, absent any exculpating evidence, T1 and T2 will 
both be held liable in Trial-I. Accordingly, each can expect to pay half the inju-
ry, D1/2. In addition, T2 can expect to pay D2 in Trial-II (because T1 will turn 
in the evidence against T2). As a result, T1 can expect to pay a total of D1/2 
and T2 a total of D1/2+D2. Consider now the parties’ payoffs if T2 takes the 
deal and (falsely) admits responsibility in Trial-I. Per Leonard, T2 will be the 
only party liable in Trial-I and can expect to pay D1. In Trial-II, neither T1 nor 
T2 will be held liable (because, per the deal, T1 will suppress the condemning 
evidence against T2). The result is that T1 will not be responsible for her ac-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See id. at 41–42; Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944); Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 
P.2d 445, 446 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); DOBBS, supra note 26, § 249, at 651 (explaining that in 
Ybarra it was “hardly conceivable that all those present contributed to [the victim’s] injury,” and 
noting that “[t]he court did not appear to argue that the facts justified a rational inference that all ac-
tors were negligent . . . [instead] [t]he court went on to suggest that it was really only holding all of 
the doctors and nurses as financial hostages so that the guilty would confess or the innocent would 
point the finger at the responsible person”). 
 195 Moreover, Leonard’s holding—that a nonsuit would be granted when the exculpatory evi-
dence is “uncontradicted”—likely imposes an impossible burden on the plaintiff. Cf. 305 P.2d at 41. 
 196 The parties must be confident that each will perform. For example, T1 may require T2 to sign 
an affidavit stating that T2 was solely responsible for the injuries inflicted during the first surgery, 
thereby locking T2 into a false statement under oath. Similarly, T2 may require that in exchange for 
the affidavit, T1 signs an affidavit declaring T2 did not commit any wrong in the surgery that is the 
subject of Trial-II and delivers to T2 the external condemning evidence. 
2021] The Case Against Collective Liability 439 
tions, and T2 can expect to pay D1. The parties’ payoffs are summarized in Ta-
ble 5 below. 
 T1 T2 
Deal 0 D1 
No Deal D1/2 D1/2+D2 
Table 5: The Parties’ Total Payoffs 
From Table 5, it is easy to see that T2 will take the deal if D1< D1/2+D2 
or D2>D1/2. A simple numerical example may be helpful. Suppose that in Tri-
al-I the expected harm is D1=$10,000. T2 will take the deal so long as 
D2>$5,000. To illustrate, consider T2’s choices when D2 is equal to $6,000, 
$20,000, and $50,000. If T2 takes the deal, T2 can expect to pay $10,000. By 
contrast, if T2 forgoes the deal, T2 can expect to pay substantially more: 
$11,000 (10K/2K+6K), $25,000 (10K/2K+20K), and $55,000 (10K/2K+50K) 
respectively.197 As the example illustrates, the incentive to enter into the deal 
increases as the gap between the expected damages (D2-D1) in the two trials 
grows. 
The result is that in cases where the parties are involved in repeated activ-
ities, they may have an incentive to collude and suppress evidence. Once 
again, a collective liability regime, such as res ipsa, may incentivize the parties 
to “talk,” not to provide truthful information that would identify the wrongdo-
er, but rather to reduce their total expected cost. Moreover, unlike Example C2, 
in Example C3, the collusion would allow T2 to reduce her exposure by falsely 
taking responsibility for the action of another and render a victim—the plain-
tiff in Trial 2—remediless. 
The concern of collusion may be exacerbated due to the fact that the par-
ties may have been “efficiently negligent,”198 in the sense that their careless 
behavior was due to their human nature. People simply cannot avoid mistakes 
when they act repeatedly over time, even if they attempt to take care at all 
times. Drivers sometimes speed up or ignore a sign even when they try to drive 
carefully. Similarly, healthcare providers are not immune to human fallibilities. 
When the parties are efficiently negligent, the moral cost of colluding may be 
very low.199 
                                                                                                                           
 197 If T2 forgoes the deal, T2 stands to pay half of the expected damage in Trial-I, $5000 (10K/2). 
In addition, T2 stands to pay the expected damage, D2, in Trial-II as T1 will provide the damning 
evidence. 
 198 See Grady, supra note 20, at 897–98 (explaining that, due to the high cost of consistent per-
formance, actors often “commit[] efficient ‘compliance errors’”—that is, inadvertent departure from 
the required rate of precaution). 
 199 Courts do not exempt efficiently negligent doctors from liability, although at least one court 
exempted a lawyer who admitted his malpractice, perhaps because of the high compliance cost. See id. 
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III. THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF NEGLIGENCE 
Collective liability suffers from another major problem that, to date, the 
prior literature ignored, and that weighs heavily against applying it. First and 
foremost, collective liability dulls the informational role of a negligence ver-
dict. Consider first a negligence verdict against an individual service provider. 
The verdict serves a number of important functions. First, it alerts future cus-
tomers that the service provider’s practices fall below the acceptable standard 
of care.200 In the short run, this information may result in reduced demand, 
lower prices for the provider’s services, and allow better providers to distin-
guish themselves.201 In the long run, market forces may encourage the service 
provider to increase her quality to the acceptable level. 
Second, a negligence verdict has a public good attribute in the sense that a 
verdict of carelessness inures to the benefit of the entire industry. It informs 
other service providers about the expected level of precaution, whether a cer-
tain procedure is outdated, and what steps they must take. For example, a neg-
ligence verdict against one producer informs others that a behavior (e.g., the 
use of a certain method) comes with higher expected liability. 
By contrast, collective liability mutes these important signals. A verdict 
against a team of healthcare providers that relies on a collective liability doc-
trine such as res ipsa does not, by definition, identify the culprit. As a result, it 
does not help consumers avoid careless actors. The result could be a market for 
lemons.202 If better providers are not able to distinguish themselves and com-
                                                                                                                           
at 900–01. Compare Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Colo. App. 1985) (concerning legal mal-
practice for failure to submit a complaint on time), with Ravi v. Williams, 536 So. 2d 1374, 1377–78 
(Ala. 1988) (holding a surgeon liable for leaving a sponge in the patient’s body), abrogation recog-
nized by Houserman v. Garrett, 902 So. 2d 670 (Ala. 2004). 
 200 See David Dranove et al., Delivering Bad News: Market Responses to Negligence, 55 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 2 (2012) (noting that “[o]bstetrics patients may be relatively poorly informed about the qual-
ity of their obstetricians, and news about a negligent act, conveyed through lawsuits or word of mouth, 
could lead patients to revise their beliefs about quality”); Juan José Ganuza et al., Product Liability 
Versus Reputation, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 231–33, 34 (2016) (discussing the “signal to the mar-
ket stemming from the specific court outcomes of the cases involving . . . a given firm” and showing 
that a liability regime can enhance market sanctions when consumers are able to observe legal out-
comes and adjust buying behavior accordingly). 
 201 See, e.g., Dranove et al., supra note 200, at 3, 9–14, 21–24 (demonstrating that obstetricians 
who were sued for medical malpractice saw an overall decrease in demand for their services); David 
W. Prince & Paul H. Rubin, The Effects of Product Liability Litigation on the Value of Firms, 4 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 44, 44, 64–71 (2002) (finding that with regard to pharmaceuticals, “the filing of a 
lawsuit, or news stories that subsequently lead to the filing of a lawsuit, is associated with significant 
losses in firm value” whereas the filed-against-firm’s competitors see greater market returns). 
 202 See Akerlof, supra note 34, at 489 (explaining that when buyers cannot distinguish between 
high-quality products (which are costly to produce) and low-quality products (the “lemons”), sellers of 
high-quality products will not be able to command high prices and will exit the market); cf. Naci 
Mocan, Can Consumers Detect Lemons? An Empirical Analysis of Information Asymmetry in the 
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mand the high price that is necessary to maintain a high-quality service, they 
may need to either stop offering their services or reduce their quality. Moreo-
ver, such a verdict will not be able to inform other service providers as to the 
acceptable standard. 
Furthermore, collective liability does not come with the same moral in-
dignation and reputational harm that accompanies individual liability. Rather, it 
allows each defendant to maintain innocence and argue that only the others 
were careless. In other words, collective liability allows each defendant (in-
cluding the injurer) to self-portray as a victim, not a villain. This latter insight 
may fuel the parties’ incentives to collude in order to suppress information. 
To illustrate, recall Example C2 where two of the defendants, T and W, 
asked the court to apply res ipsa against them and another defendant, N. If W 
takes the deal (and agrees to be subject to res ipsa together with T, the true tort-
feasor), W would be held liable for something W did not do. But the cost of 
doing so may not be prohibitive. Even if W does not avoid the stigma of a 
court record, W will be fully indemnified by T, who would likely pay for W’s 
willingness to share the initial burden—W’s share of $500,000.203 Importantly, 
for the conspiracy to work (i.e., for collective liability to apply), both W and T 
would have to deny responsibility. This, in turn, would allow W and T to main-
tain their innocence by blaming each other or just N (if N was not able to ex-
culpate herself). In other words, collective liability creates a smokescreen—a 
veil of ignorance—that allows culpable parties to escape moral indignation and 
market sanctions. 
Example C3, where T2 agrees to take responsibility for T1’s actions in 
exchange for T1’s willingness to suppress evidence against T2, highlights an-
other concern.204 Collective liability may result in individual liability, but 
against the wrong party, thereby tampering with the informational function of 
negligence. If T2 fails to take the deal, T2 will be found liable in Trial-I for 
something T2 did not do (due to res ipsa), and in Trial-II for T2’s own wrong-
doing (due to the damning evidence). By contrast, if T2 takes the deal, T2 
would be liable for the lesser injury and may even escape the stigma of a court 
record (if T2 admits, the parties will likely settle). Moreover, the lesser injury 
is more likely to be within the policy limit of T2’s medical malpractice insur-
ance, thereby reducing T2’s personal (immediate monetary) cost to a fraction 
                                                                                                                           
Market for Child Care, 20 J. POPULAR ECON. 743, 743–44, 774 (2006) (finding that “the market for 
center-based child care has aspects of a ‘market for lemons’”). 
 203 See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text (discussing Example C2 and the potential 
effect of insurance policies in such settings). 
 204 See supra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (discussing Example C3 and describing situ-
ations in which collective liability can encourage collusion). 
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of the harm caused. In both cases, however, the verdict will fail to serve its 
informational function. In fact, it may help disseminate false information. 
This, of course, does not mean that collective liability should never be ap-
plied. In some circumstances, collective liability may be the best available op-
tion. The informational role of negligence and the detrimental effects discussed 
in Part II suggest that group liability should be applied with much caution and be 
avoided if better alternatives exist. Part IV below discusses such alternatives. 
IV. RECONSIDERING COLLECTIVE LIABILITY 
To date, the prior literature on collective liability focused on finding the 
culprit.205 The recognition that collective sanctions can adversely impact care 
and activity levels and incentivize collusion calls into question its usefulness 
and should be alarming to those who seek justice and efficiency. This Part ex-
plores two alternatives to the Ybarra-style collective liability regime and illus-
trates their effect using real-life examples. In deviation from the prior litera-
ture, both alternatives abandon the quest for the true injurer altogether. The 
first, discussed in Subpart IV.A, considers collective liability regimes that 
avoid the dilution trap (e.g., by adjusting damages upward). The second alter-
native, discussed in Subpart IV.B, explores the possibility of imposing liability 
on one chosen (likely innocent) party. 
A. Collective Liability 
1. Theory and Application 
One possible alternative is not simply to hold everyone liable but also to 
ensure that the incentives to take care and monitor are not overly diluted. This 
can be done, for example, by requiring each member of the group to fully in-
ternalize the consequences of the injurer’s actions.206 Many collective liability 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 22, at 1561–64 (explaining how collective res ipsa can extract 
information that would identify the injurer). Grady posits that courts apply the doctrine in cases where 
compliance with the standard of care is especially difficult because, in such cases, “the defendant was 
probably negligent.” Grady, supra note 20, at 922–25 (arguing that Byrne is a “strong res ipsa case” 
because it involved a dangerous activity—moving barrels above a public sidewalk—that necessitated 
a high compliance rate); see also supra Subpart II.C. 
 206 See Levmore, supra note 22, at 1561–65. Levmore’s “overextraction” rule would require each 
group member to pay more than the damage incurred by the victim. Levmore lauds the ability of col-
lective liability to force information out of witnesses. Id. His goal is to allow collective liability re-
gimes to also persuade the tortfeasor, not just the witnesses, to confess. Id. By contrast, this Article 
doubts the ability of collective liability to extract useful information and shows that collective liability 
can result in suppression of information, lying, and inefficient levels of monitoring. These differences 
between Levmore’s solution and the solution proposed herein are not merely theoretical. Levmore’s 
article focuses on the tortfeasor, and accordingly, under his rule, “it is imperative that the target group 
contain the actual wrongdoer.” Id. at 1576. Conversely, this Article bypasses the identification prob-
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regimes have taken this route. Consider, for example, the Twin Case discussed 
in the Introduction.207 The court required each of the brothers to fully pay child 
support. With two fathers, the child received a windfall. She was awarded 
twice the child support that a similarly situated child would receive. Yet, by 
doing so, the court ensured that the culprit fully internalized the consequences 
of his actions, thereby providing others with ex ante incentives to avoid similar 
harms. This approach also disincentivizes the defendants-twins from engaging 
in collusive behaviors. The One Strike Rule employs a similar solution.208 In 
the context of public housing, if one tenant (or a tenant’s guest) engages in 
drug activity, all are evicted. The result is that each member of the household 
suffers the full breadth of the law, not just a fraction thereof. 
Many historical and modern examples of collective liability regimes fol-
low this pattern: they impose on each member of the group full responsibility 
for the culprit’s actions. Consider, for example, the “nine familial extermina-
tions” rule of the Qin and Tang dynasties in ancient China.209 The rule was a 
tactic to identify and eliminate political dissidents.210 When one was suspected 
of a crime, nine levels of relatives were punished.211 These included the sus-
pect’s parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, siblings and siblings-in-
law, uncles and aunts and their spouses, cousins, spouse, and the spouse’s par-
ents.212 
Classrooms and the army are familiar forms of non-dilutable sanctions.213 
The act of one subjects everyone to the same severe sanctions. A recent exam-
ple is the punishment of one thousand Canadian military cadets in 2018. A few 
                                                                                                                           
lem altogether. Instead, it would allow, under certain circumstances, to hold liable only one clearly 
innocent party (e.g., the hospital in a case like Ybarra). Moreover, Levmore’s rule faces hurdles that 
require it to “remain[] a thought experiment.” Id. at 1578. For example, the rule necessitates mecha-
nisms that would allow the tortfeasor to confess anonymously or otherwise avoid additional penalties 
(beyond payment). Id. at 1575–76. The solutions pressed here, although not free of concerns and 
shortcomings, do not focus on the tortfeasor and do not require such mechanisms. 
 207 See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Twin Case). 
 208 See supra notes 13–22 and accompanying text (explaining how authorities apply the One 
Strike Rule). 
 209 See F.W. Mote, Fang Hsiao-ju, in DICTIONARY OF MING BIOGRAPHY, 1368–1644, at 431–32 
(L. Carrington Goodrich & Chaoying Fang eds., 1976); S.Y. Teng, The Role of Family in the Chinese 
Legal System, 11 J. ASIAN HIST. 121, 142 (1977). 
 210 Meghan MacRae, One Thousand Cuts . . . Terrifying Ancient Chinese Torture and Execution 
Methods, CVLT NATION (Oct. 23, 2014), https://cvltnation.com/one-thousand-cuts-terrifying-ancient-
chinese-torture-and-execution-methods/ [https://perma.cc/X293-NFGJ] (recounting that, in one case, 
the emperor executed 873 individuals related to a scholar who refused to write the emperor’s inaugu-
ral address). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See, e.g., Irwin Lipnowski, A Partial Rehabilitation of the Principle of Collective Punishment, 
8 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 121, 122–23 (1993). 
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cadets wore jeans during off-campus hours in violation of the institution’s 
rules.214 As a result, all one thousand cadets were confined to their rooms, had 
to endure inspections, and were required to parade in frigid weather without 
proper clothing.215 
The solution—holding the innocent and the culprit liable without overly 
diluting their liability—comes with a number of shortcomings. One concern is 
a moral hazard. When the expected award to the victim exceeds the victim’s 
injury, the victim may be interested in being subject to accidents that would 
give rise to group liability.216 The victim may even seek to collude with others 
to orchestrate such a tort. Another concern, likely a more serious one, is a re-
duction in activity levels. If an actor is unable to shield herself from liability by 
taking care—that is, when being faultless is not a defense (or impossible to 
prove)—she may try to avoid activities that may give rise to group liability. 
These two insights help explain why the solution was applied in some 
cases but not others. In the Twin Case, requiring each brother to fully pay child 
support did not pose a substantial risk of moral hazard. It is unlikely that the 
verdict would incentivize would-be-mothers or fathers to engage in a similar 
activity to gain more child support for their offspring. 
The second concern—a reduction in activity levels—also explains why 
the solution may be suitable in the examples above but not in other cases. 
Lower activity levels may be less of a concern—in fact, they may be the very 
reason—for holding faultless actors liable. This is the case when the behavior 
at stake is considered undesirable. For example, in the Twin Case, holding the 
innocent brother liable could encourage him to avoid impersonating his brother 
in the future. Similarly, in the context of the nine-familial-exterminations rule, 
class punishment, and army sanctions, collective liability may incentivize ac-
tors to chill speech when the speech is considered by the rule-maker (i.e., the 
emperor, teacher, or commander) to be undesirable.217 
                                                                                                                           
 214 David Pugliese, Updated—Battle Over Jeans at the Royal Military College Results in 1,000 
Cadets Being Punished, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Mar. 2, 2018), https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/
defence-watch/battle-over-jeans-at-the-royal-military-college-results-in-1000-cadets-losing-privileges 
[https://perma.cc/48GZ-2DLD]. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Consider an accident with an expected harm of $100. If each of five defendants will be re-
quired to fully compensate the victim, the latter can expect a net gain of $400—the total compensa-
tion, $500 (5x100), minus the actual damages, $100. There are ways to mitigate the moral hazard 
concern. For example, a court can direct any compensation in excess of the victim’s damage—the 
$400 in the above example—to a third party (e.g., a charity). 
 217 See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text (discussing such examples). 
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2. Frankpledge & the One Party Pays Solution 
The compulsory system of law enforcement and policing in medieval 
England, known as the frankpledge, is another famous example on which law 
and economic scholars rely. Saul Levmore, for example, explains that under 
the frankpledge, a tithing—that is, a “small groups of (at least ten) individu-
als—forfeited their bonds or deposits when one of their number escaped arrest 
for a crime.”218 He then immediately draws an analogy to res ipsa. The frank-
pledge, he notes, “is surprisingly similar to the famous case of Ybarra v. 
Spangard, where a patient was able to recover from a number of health profes-
sionals for an injury sustained during an operation.”219 Daryl Levinson draws a 
similar analogy. He explains that “[v]iewed functionally, pre-modern collective 
sanction regimes like blood feud and frankpledge seem continuous with simi-
lar regimes in more developed societies.”220 According to Levinson, modern 
analogs include Ybarra (i.e., collective res ipsa).221 In such a case, he argues, 
collective liability has an “information forcing” feature.222 
The analogy, however, is incomplete. The frankpledge, blood feuds, and 
military sanctions are very different from the liability imposed in Ybarra. To 
begin, collective sanctions such as the One Strike Rule and the Twin Case can 
be viewed as a form of strict liability.223 By definition, they impose liability on 
faultless members of the group. As explained above, a known side effect of 
holding innocent actors liable is a possible reduction in activity levels. The no-
fault liability may be justified when the goal is to curb actions that are deemed 
undesirable or immoral. For example, in public housing, the “no-fault” evic-
tion rule may incentivize tenants to socialize less if they are worried that their 
guests may bring drugs with them.224 And in the Twin Case, holding the inno-
cent brother liable could result in less social fraud and what is, in essence, 
rape. 
                                                                                                                           
 218 Levmore, supra note 22, at 1562. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Levinson, supra note 19, at 350. 
 221 Id. at 379 (arguing that Ybarra exemplifies the “information-forcing feature of collective sanc-
tions [that] is familiar from the frankpledge system, which was designed to motivate neighbors to help 
enforce the law by snitching on one another”). 
 222 Id. 
 223 The Supreme Court in Rucker referred to the rule as a “no-fault” rule and one that imposes 
“[s]trict liability.” Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002). 
 224 This was the court’s stated goal in Rucker. Id. (“With drugs leading to ‘murders, muggings, 
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requires substantial government expenditures,’ 42 U.S.C. § 11901(4) (1994), it was reasonable for 
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income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs,’ § 11901(1) (1994).”). 
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Similarly, in the frankpledge, a compulsory system, there was no concern 
that imposing liability on the innocent members of the group would result in 
less individual enlisting for the tithing. By contrast, in the medical context, a 
reduction in activity levels is a source of much concern. For example, to shield 
themselves from liability for a harm they did not cause, physicians may decide 
to conduct fewer surgeries (even when a surgery is in the patient’s best inter-
est) or elect to specialize in non-surgical medicine.225 
Res ipsa is also different in another important aspect from its purported 
analogs—the frankpledge and military sanctions. If taken as described, in these 
collective liability regimes, the act of one person imposes the same level of 
sanction on innocent parties. In the army context, if one cadet wears jeans, all 
of them must run in the rain. In the frankpledge system, each member of the 
tithing could lose his bond or deposit for one person’s wrongdoing. In these 
cases, the expected sanction would not become diluted as the number of actors 
in the group increased. Collective res ipsa, however, is different. Because lia-
bility is often capped, as the number of actors increases, the individual ex-
pected liability of each actor may decrease.226 As Part II explained, the result 
could be inefficient levels of care and monitoring as well as the suppression of 
information. Res ipsa, in that sense, is more of an exception to the rule, rather 
than the rule that law and economic scholars portray it to be.227 
Analogizing res ipsa to the frankpledge system may in fact be correct, but 
for the opposite reason: to show collective liability’s shortcomings. There is 
evidence that at least some forms of the frankpledge system were very differ-
ent from those described by legal scholars. Unlike its monolithic description in 
the literature on collective liability, the frankpledge system is subject to much 
confusion—not surprising given that the system originated around 1066, a mil-
lennium ago.228 Notwithstanding its description in the legal literature, there 
was no single, uniform frankpledge system.229 Rather, the frankpledge system 
took different forms in different localities and morphed over time.230 The num-
ber of people in the group also varied. In some cases, the number was as small as 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See, e.g., Dillbary et al., supra note 112, at 487 (finding “evidence that psychiatrists may re-
spond to increased levels of liability by screening and avoiding the patients that are most at risk for 
committing suicide”); J. Shahar Dillbary, Multiple Causes and Stacked Inferences, 176 J. INSTITU-
TIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 54, 68 (2020) (explaining how collective liability may adversely 
impact activity levels). 
 226 See supra Part II. 
 227 This may be due to the fact that res ipsa was designed to impose individual liability before it 
morphed, perhaps immaturely, into a collective liability regime. 
 228 Bruce R. O’Brien, From Morðor to Murdrum: The Preconquest Origin and Norman Revival 
of the Murder Fine, 71 SPECULUM 321, 332 (1996). 
 229 D.A. Crowley, The Later History of Frankpledge, 48 BULL. INST. HIST. RSCH. 1, 2–9 (1975) 
(exploring regional differences). 
 230 Id. 
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ten (a tithing) or lower, whereas in others, it included one hundred members or 
even an entire village—an important feature that the legal literature has ig-
nored.231 
Importantly, according to leading accounts, dilution of liability was not 
only possible, but it may have also accounted for the decline of the frank-
pledge system. Some historians report that when the tithing failed to fulfill its 
mission, the fine was amerced on the tithing, implying that all members were 
responsible and accordingly that liability was collective, and as such subject to 
dilution.232 Others are more explicit. William Morris, the leading frankpledge 
historian, reports that “if . . . the tithing failed to perform its duty, all were still 
amerced in common.”233 
It is thus not a surprise that such forms of frankpledge resulted in collu-
sion to suppress information—as Part II would predict. For example, H.R.T. 
Summerson reports cases where the frankpledge led vills to “close ranks 
against officials” and “unite to conceal a felony or protect a felon.”234 Morris 
focuses on another concern highlighted in Part II—a decreased incentive to 
monitor. He explains that as the number of the group members, n, increased, 
and the fine, D, remained constant, the individual incentive of each member to 
monitor dissipated: 
To bring home to each locality a realizing sense of its responsibility, 
therefore, [in 1285] Edward I enacted a new law making people of 
each hundred and franchise responsible for robberies and damages 
arising through their failure to produce the offenders. The half-mark 
usually paid by the tithing for the escape of an offending member in 
the time of Henry II [i.e., the 1100s],—so heavy a burden that in 
some instances the sheriff seems to have been compelled to defer its 
collection for a year or even longer,—had now come to represent a 
far slighter value, the payment of which was inadequate to spur the 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Cf. id. at 3–7, 11 (describing the evolution of different tithings); O’Brien, supra note 228, at 
322, 327. 
 232 See, e.g., WILLIAM ALFRED MORRIS, THE FRANKPLEDGE SYSTEM 96, 99 (1910) (explaining 
that the fine was “exacted . . . from the tithing” and that the “tithing . . . paid the fine”); O’Brien, su-
pra note 228, at 322 (reporting that “when a Frenchman was found slain, the districts surrounding the 
site would be amerced for a substantial fine unless the English identified or turned the slayer”). 
 233 MORRIS, supra note 232, at 108, 128 (emphasis added); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM 
MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 44 (1987) (“The penalty for [the 
tithing’s] failure in either of [its] tasks was a fine—again, imposed on the collectivity of the frank-
pledge . . . .” (emphasis added)); Stephanie Juliano, Superheroes, Bandits, and Cyber-Nerds: Explor-
ing the History and Contemporary Development of the Vigilante, 7 J. INT’L COM. L & TECH. 44, 50 
(2012) (reporting that “if [one] member was fined, . . . the rest of the group could be held accounta-
ble”). 
 234 H.R.T. Summerson, The Structure of Law Enforcement in Thirteenth Century England, 23 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 317 (1979); see also YEAZELL, supra note 233, at 49–50. 
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community to capture a fugitive neighbor with whom it was often in 
sympathy.235 
Note that as the number of members in the tithing, n, increased by a factor 
of 10 (from 10 to 100), the expected liability was reduced by the same factor 
(from D/n to D/10n).236 
These accounts show that the frankpledge system (or at least some forms 
of it) was far from the ideal liability regime portrayed by the prior literature. It 
was ineffective and incentivized group members to lie and collude with others 
to lie.237 In summary, to the extent that the frankpledge can be analogized to 
res ipsa, it highlights many of the shortcomings and concerns that can plague 
collective liability regimes. 
B. Imposing Liability on One (Non-Random) Innocent Party 
Another solution that abandons the quest for identifying the culprit is to 
hold only one party, even if clearly innocent, liable for the culprit’s behavior. 
The single faultless liable party should be the one in the best position to ex 
ante avoid the harm and ex post identify the injurers. To ensure adequate ex 
ante incentives, the actor should also be solvent enough to pay the expected 
judgment. Although imposing liability on one clearly innocent party may ini-
tially sound patently unfair, such a regime can be justified on economic and 
fairness grounds. 
Consider, for example, the anti-graffiti ordinance proposed in 2009 by 
residents and local businesses of Orange County, California. The proposal 
came after annual graffiti abatement costs reached $2.4 million.238 The ordi-
nance proposed to hold faultless parents responsible for their minor children’s 
actions. This included responsibility “for paying the fine, for paying restitu-
tion[,] for scrubbing out the graffiti [and] accompany[ing] their children for at 
least some of the community service.”239 The underlying assumption—whether 
                                                                                                                           
 235 MORRIS, supra note 232, at 152 (emphasis added). 
 236 The individual liability, D/10n, decreased even further to D/20n as “[t]he actual sum collected 
. . . in the reign of Edward I, as well as in the reigns of his son and grandson, was often . . . just half 
the original amount.” Id. at 152–53. 
 237 It was clear by the late 1200s that the frankpledge had failed to fulfill its primary objects. Id. at 
151–52. 
 238 Doug Irving, Santa Ana Residents Want To Punish Parents for Graffiti, ORANGE CNTY. REG. 
(June 8, 2009), https://www.ocregister.com/2009/06/08/santa-ana-residents-want-to-punish-parents-
for-graffiti [https://perma.cc/7XHN-9N7S]. 
 239 Id.; see also SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE ORDINANCES § 10-224.1 (2020) (imposing collective 
liability on the parents and their “minor for payment of all fines”); SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE ORDI-
NANCES § 10-229(a) (imposing collective liability for abatement expenses on a minor engaged in 
graffiti violations and on “parent(s) or legal guardian(s) having custody and control of the minor”); 
SANTA ANA, CAL., CODE ORDINANCES § 10-229(d) (extending parents’ liability to “all costs to the 
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factually correct or not—must have been that the parents are in the best posi-
tion to control their children.240 
Another example is the frankpledge system. Recall that because the fine 
was collectively imposed on a group of actors, the individual liability of each 
was diluted and so was the incentive of each to monitor. The dilution concern 
was mitigated to some extent by nominating one (and in some cases, two) 
members as chief pledge. Chief pledges were men who “had the security of at 
least a modest holding of land and a permanent place in the village communi-
ty.”241 Part of their role was to collect from members of the tithing the amounts 
amerced on the group. Because most members were poor and there was no 
right of contribution, the chief pledge had more at stake. Chief pledges “occu-
pied the unenviable position of being responsible to courts for the behavior of 
the groups they represented, without being able to invoke the aid of those 
courts to call the members to task.”242 It is thus not surprising that some con-
cluded that “collective behavior was in fact ‘thinly disguised individual-
ism.’”243 In other words, the chief pledge’s incentive to see that the group suc-
ceeded in its tasks was stronger than that of the other group members. Being at 
high risk of solely paying the amount owed by the tithing, the chief pledge had 
a strong motivation and the authority to select reliable members, replace in-
competent ones, and take other actions to mitigate their liability.244 
                                                                                                                           
city or any person or business incurred in connection with the removal of graffiti caused by conduct of 
said minor, and for all attorney’s fees, court costs, and civil penalties incurred in connection with the 
civil prosecution of any claim for damages or reimbursement up to twenty-five thousand dollars”). 
 240 By contrast, under the common law, parents are not vicariously liable for their children. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 43, § 123, at 913. When only one tenant is the formal lessee, as was the 
case with Ms. Rucker, the One Strike Rule can be viewed, at least on its face, as a modern version of 
the one-innocent-party-pays-all solution. However, because the sanction—an eviction—works equally 
against all members of the household, the rule incentivizes each member to monitor against drug ac-
tivities. As such, it seems to fall under the first solution—group liability. See supra note 14 (discuss-
ing an eviction case involving the federal One Strike Rule). 
 241 Crowley, supra note 229, at 3; see MORRIS, supra note 232, at 104–05. 
 242 YEAZELL, supra note 233, at 86, 89 (“[W]hen the chief pledge returned from the view of 
frankpledge with the inevitable news that the tithing had been amerced? . . . [L]iability simply lay 
where it fell, with the representative of the group bearing individual responsibility for collective obli-
gations.”); see also MORRIS, supra note 232, at 103; Crowley, supra note 229, at 3–4. 
 243 YEAZELL, supra note 233, at 89 (quoting FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOR-
OUGH 78 (1898)). 
 244 MORRIS, supra note 232, at 108–09 (discussing the chief pledge’s ability to “keep the best 
possible men in the position,” have “troublesome person transferred” and fulfill his collection duties); 
Crowley, supra note 229, at 3–4. The chief pledge position was so unpopular that some tried to escape 
it, even by paying a large bribe. MORRIS, supra note 232, at 110; see also YEAZELL, supra note 233, 
at 89; Crowley, supra note 229, at 10 (reporting that “[i]n the thirteen-fifties surety obligations were 
removed from the chief pledges” so that they were only “held responsible for tithingmen failing to 
attend the view, but even that degree of corporate responsibility . . . was abandoned by 1357”). 
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Medical cases like Ybarra and Anderson are also good candidates for 
such an alternative regime. In these cases, both practice and theory teach us 
that attempts to identify the injurer by imposing collective liability are futile.245 
By contrast, holding the hospital—the one party who clearly did not injure the 
victim—liable for the injurer’s actions may mitigate many of the concerns 
highlighted above. Importantly, liability should be imposed only on one party 
(e.g., the hospital or the chief surgeon). 
To begin with, such a regime will eliminate the ills of diluted liability. As 
the sole liable party, the hospital will have a strong incentive to ex ante invest 
in care, select the best procedure and machinery, hire and contract with the ap-
propriate healthcare providers, and ensure that they are adequately trained. 
Second, the hospital is also in the best position to monitor and reduce doctors’ 
compliance errors—the main rationale underlying res ipsa according to 
many.246 The hospital can do so by requiring healthcare providers to use tech-
niques or supply machinery that would reduce the risk of avoidable harm, by 
instituting procedures that would reduce the rate of compliance errors and in-
stalling monitoring devices. 
Additionally, the hospital—as the only liable party—will also have the 
incentive and likely the means to identify the true injurer. It is true that finding 
the culprit will not exculpate the hospital (liability would be absolute).247 
However, identifying the injurer will allow the hospital to reduce future expo-
sure. This is especially so given the repeat nature of the activity at hand: doc-
tors and nurses engaging in multiple surgeries. The hospital is also uniquely 
positioned to produce identifying evidence that would help it track and punish 
the culprit. It can do so by using recording technology and by creating logs of 
proper chains of custody over instruments and unconscious patients. Moreover, 
as the sole liable party overseeing multiple surgeries, the hospital will also 
have the incentive to accumulate and review injury data in order to identify 
healthcare providers who fail (or likely failed) to meet the standard of care, 
even if they did not cause a serious injury or were not sued by patients.248 
Holding the hospital liable comes with other benefits. Hospital insurers 
will likely act as a second monitoring agent and put pressure on the hospital to 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See supra notes 173–179 and accompanying text (discussing how, in some situations, collec-
tive liability may incentivize actors to collude and lie, rather than provide information that would 
identify the tortfeasor). 
 246 See supra notes 33, 164–179 and accompanying text (reviewing the prior literature); Grady, 
supra note 20, at 907–12. 
 247 The discussion here is by no means exhaustive. One can envision a number of alternative 
regimes that would avoid the dilution trap and still maintain the hospital’s incentives. 
 248 Reputation and competition—two related market mechanisms—may provide a similar incen-
tive, but due to the structure of the market for healthcare services and the local monopolies enjoyed by 
certain hospitals, they may not be effective enough. 
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properly monitor its healthcare providers. The fact that the hospital, patients, 
and insurance companies are all bound by a contractual framework will likely 
result in better and more transparent risk-spreading effort. It would also help 
set the price of medical services at the proper level. It may even lead to better 
competition between hospitals (where such competition is possible).249 
Finally, it should be noted what this solution is not. Under this proposed 
alternative, the solely liable (and possibly innocent) party cannot be chosen 
randomly. The reason is that a random selection would also have a dilutive 
effect. With a group of n actors, a random selection means that each group 
member faces a 1/n chance of being selected, and thus each has an expected 
liability of D/n. Rather, a rule that imposes liability on one innocent actor 
should specify ex ante who will be the solely liable party in case of an injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Collective liability—defined as the imposition of liability on a group that 
may include innocent actors—is commonplace. From ancient to modern times, 
legislators, regulators, courts, and market actors were, and still are, willing to 
impose such liability when they believe that the culprit is a member of the 
group. 
Although collective liability regimes are ubiquitous, they remain under-
theorized and under-studied. The few articles that have investigated the effects 
of communal liability regimes justify their application on two grounds: deter-
rence and information-sharing. This Article questions these rationales and 
demonstrates that, in some cases, collective liability regimes may lead to the 
opposite results and perverse outcomes. This Article reveals that imposing lia-
bility on many may lead to under-deterrence. Group liability can even incentiv-
ize actors to aggravate injuries, inflate the group size, and engage in new forms 
of offensive and defensive practices. 
The Article also shows that cross-monitoring can be impossible, ineffi-
cient, and ineffective. Even when cross-monitoring is justified, tort law raises 
hurdles that make cross-monitoring infeasible or sub-optimal. The infor-
mation-extraction rationale is also limited. Using a simple model, the Article 
shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, communal liability may incen-
tivize parties to suppress evidence and provide false information, either unilat-
                                                                                                                           
 249 One could argue that like collective liability, holding one innocent party liable—a form of 
absolute liability—creates a veil of ignorance that mutes important signals to consumers and produc-
ers alike. However, unlike collective liability, which may incentivize parties to suppress information 
and lie, the imposition of liability on one innocent party who is better able to take care, monitor, and 
incentivize others to do the same, should mitigate the concern. Furthermore, the reputational damage 
may not fall on the actual injurer, but it will fall on the hospital, thereby providing a clear market 
signal to third parties. 
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erally or in collusion with others. These findings call into question the useful-
ness of collective liability regimes and should concern those who seek justice 
and efficiency alike. 
This Article continues to challenge the prior literature by also showing 
that not all collective liability regimes are equal. Some (like res ipsa) raise 
more concerns than others. This Article ends with a call for much caution in 
applying collective liability regimes. It recommends the re-institution of anti-
dilution measures that were removed by many tort reforms, and it offers two 
alternatives that could remedy the ills that plague many collective liability re-
gimes without falling into the identification trap. 
